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The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts
Itai Grinberg
ABsTrAcT
The international tax system is in the midst of a contest between automatic information 
reporting and anonymous withholding models for ensuring that nations have the ability to 
tax offshore accounts.  At stake is the extent of many countries’ capacity to tax investment 
income of individuals and profits of closely held businesses through an income tax in an 
increasingly financially integrated world.
Incongruent initiatives of the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), Switzerland, and the United States together represent an 
emerging international regime in which financial institutions act to facilitate countries’ 
ability to tax their residents’ offshore accounts.  The growing consensus that financial 
institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries represents a remarkable shift in 
international norms that has yet to be recognized in the academic literature.
The debate, however, is about how financial institutions should serve as cross-border 
tax intermediaries, and for which countries.  Different outcomes in this contest portend 
starkly different futures for the extent of cross-border tax administrative assistance available 
to most countries.  The triumph of an automatic information reporting model over an 
anonymous withholding model is key to (1) allowing for the taxation of principal, (2) 
ensuring that most countries are included in the benefit of financial institutions serving 
as cross-border tax intermediaries, (3) encouraging taxpayer engagement with the polity, 
and (4) supporting sovereign policy flexibility, especially in emerging and developing 
economies.  This Article closes with proposals to help reconcile the emerging automatic 
information exchange approaches to produce an effective multilateral system.
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INTRODUCTION 
Approximately $7.8 trillion, representing more than 6 percent of all global 
wealth, is managed through offshore accounts.1  Beginning in 2008, well-publicized 
cross-border tax evasion scandals focused political attention on offshore tax eva-
sion in the world’s major economies.  One of the major scandals involved the United 
Bank of Switzerland (UBS), one of Europe’s largest banks.  Another involved 
LGT, a bank controlled by the royal family of Liechtenstein.  The details read like 
a thriller.  Bankers smuggled toothpaste tubes full of diamonds across borders, 
while governments bought stolen disks that identified tax evaders and handed new 
identities to the informants.2 
In the midst of the financial crisis, with its attendant budgetary pressures, the 
political response to the offshore tax evasion scandals was swift.  Presidents and fi-
nance ministers insisted on improved transparency to combat offshore tax abuses.  
Recognizing its vulnerability to demands for transparency, Switzerland developed 
its own proposal: anonymous cross-border tax withholding in lieu of an infor-
mation reporting scheme that would promote transparency. 
Thus began a global contest between automatic information reporting and 
anonymous withholding models for ensuring that states have the ability to tax 
offshore accounts.  The latest moves as of this writing came in February, April, 
June, and July of 2012.3  In February, the governments of six large developed econ-
  
1. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., GLOBAL WEALTH 2011: SHAPING A NEW TOMORROW 13 (2011), 
available at http://www.bcg.com.pl/documents/file77766.pdf.  For the purposes of this Article, 
wealth managed through offshore accounts means “assets booked in a country where the investor has 
no legal residence or tax domicile.”  Id. 
2. Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at 
C1; Carter Dougherty & Mark Landler, Tax Scandal in Germany Fans Claims of Inequity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at C8; Liechtenstein Tax Evasion Scandal: Informant in German Investigation 
‘Fears’ for His Life, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
business/0,1518,540283,00.html. 
3. An earlier version of this Article first appeared on SSRN in January of 2012.  Readers should view 
events after July 1, 2012 as generally beyond the scope of this Article.  The author intends to address 
more recent events in a follow-up paper.  Nevertheless, it is of note that since July 1, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom have issued a Model Intergovernmental 
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, the United States and 
the United Kingdom have signed such a “FATCA agreement,” the German Bundestag has held 
hearings on the Swiss–German anonymous withholding agreement, and the United States 
Treasury has announced that it is in discussions with more than fifty jurisdictions around the 
world regarding intergovernmental approaches to implement FATCA.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Treasury, U.S. Engaging With More Than 50 Jurisdictions to Curtail Offshore Tax Evasion 
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-release/Pages/tg1759.aspx.  See, e.g., 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
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omies, including the United States, issued a joint statement contemplating a shared 
commitment to developing a common model for the automatic exchange of tax 
information and reaffirmed that commitment in a model intergovernmental 
agreement issued over the summer.4  In April, treaty protocols entered into by 
Germany and the United Kingdom with Switzerland and a new agreement be-
tween Austria and Switzerland affirmed those countries’ interests in anonymous 
withholding by the Swiss.5  In June, Switzerland and the United States issued a 
joint statement that defused the direct confrontation between the two countries 
over U.S. legislation generally requiring non-U.S. financial institutions to report 
  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Improve International Tax Compliance 
and to Implement FATCA, U.S.–UK, Sept. 12, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-12-2012.pdf; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Releases Model Intergovernmental Agreement for 
Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to Improve Offshore Tax Compliance 
and Reduce Burden: Agreement Developed With France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom Marks Important Milestone in Combatting Offshore Tax Evasion (July 26, 
2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1653.aspx; Finanzausschuss 
Anhörungen: Umsetzungsgesetz zum Abkommen Deutschland–Schweiz (BT-Drs. 17/10059): 
Stellungnahmen [Finance Committee Hearings: Implementation Act for the Germany–Switzerland 
Treaty (BT-Drs. 17/10059): Opinions], BUNDESTAG, http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/ 
a07/anhoerungen/2012/098/Stellungnahmen/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).  These events 
do not alter the basic thrust of the argument.   
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement From the United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving 
International Tax Compliance and Implementing FATCA (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Documents/020712 Treasury IRS FATCA Joint Statement.pdf 
[hereinafter Joint Statement I]; MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO IMPROVE 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND TO IMPLEMENT FATCA (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf [hereinafter MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AGREEMENT]. 
5. Protokoll zur Änderung des am 21. September 2011 in Berlin unterzeichneten Abkommens 
zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland über 
Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt [Protocol Amending the Agreement 
Between the Swiss Confederation and the Federal Republic of Germany on Cooperation in the Area 
of Taxation and Financial Markets Signed in Berlin September 21, 2011], Ger.–Switz., Apr. 5, 2012 
(Ger.), available at http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/26526.pdf 
[hereinafter Ger.–Switz. Protocol Amendment]; Protocol Amending the Agreement Between the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Swiss Confederation on Cooperation 
in the Area of Taxation, U.K.–Switz., Oct. 6, 2011, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/ 
protocol-amend-ukswiss-agree.pdf [hereinafter U.K.–Switz. Protocol Amendment]; Abkommen 
zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Republik Österreich über die 
Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt [Agreement Between the Swiss 
Confederation and Austria on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation and Financial Markets], Austria–
Switz., Apr. 13, 2012 (Ger.), available at http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/ 
attachments/26559.pdf [hereinafter Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement].  
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information on accounts held by U.S. persons,6 while allowing the broader contest 
between anonymous withholding and automatic information exchange to play out.  
The outcome of the debate over whether automatic information reporting or 
anonymous withholding should prevail will affect states’ abilities to tax their wealth-
iest residents’ income.  The capacity to make, hold, and manage investments 
through offshore financial institutions7 has increased dramatically in recent years, 
while the cost of such services has plummeted.8  Individuals now find it substan-
tially easier to underreport or not to report investment earnings through the use of 
offshore accounts, and experience suggests that such accounts may also be used to 
help closely held businesses evade tax on income earned domestically.  Conse-
quently, the principal held in offshore accounts and the investment earnings gen-
erated through such accounts may go untaxed. 
Under either an automatic information reporting or an anonymous withhold-
ing model for cross-border tax administrative assistance, global financial institu-
tions are co-opted by governments as cross-border tax intermediaries.  In this 
important respect, the two models are variants of a single emerging regime.  
However, the contest between information reporting and anonymous withholding 
models for how financial institutions will provide cross-border tax administrative 
assistance implicates broad questions about the future of tax sovereignty in a glob-
alized economy and about the treatment of the wealthiest vis-à-vis other taxpayers.  
Whereas anonymous withholding delegates tax collection to a foreign entity, au-
tomatic information reporting shores up a government’s capacity to tax its own 
citizens. 
The stakes in the battle between automatic information exchange and anon-
ymous withholding are particularly high for many emerging and developing econ-
  
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, U.S. & Switz., Joint Statement From the United States and 
Switzerland Regarding a Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA 
(June 21, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/FATCA Joint 
Statement US-Switzerland.pdf [hereinafter Joint Statement II].  See Part II.B.3, infra, for a full 
discussion of this legislation, commonly known as “FATCA.” 
7. I use the term “offshore financial institution” to refer to any financial institution outside a given 
investor’s jurisdiction of legal residence or tax domicile.  This use of the term “offshore financial 
institution” differs from much of the literature regarding “offshore financial centers.”  That literature 
tends to categorize individual jurisdictions as “onshore” and “offshore” centers.  See, e.g., Andrew K. 
Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, Offshore Financial Centres: Parasites or Symbionts?, 117 ECON. J. 1310 
(2007).  In contrast, I view a financial institution in the United Kingdom serving an Indian investor 
as an “offshore financial institution” with respect to that Indian investor. 
8. Maintaining the capacity for large, developed economies to tax capital income under such circum-
stances has been a subject of scholarly concern for many years.  See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization, 
Technological Developments, and the Work of Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1262, 1274–
75 (2001). 
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omies.  For these countries, the question is not whether their wealthy taxpayers’ 
access to offshore accounts will weaken enforcement but whether, given such ac-
cess, taxes on capital income can be enforced at all.  In many such economies, a 
concentrated group of well-off individuals composes the bulk of the individual 
income tax base.  Domestic financial institutions are also often relatively undevel-
oped.  Thus, it is commonplace for the wealthy to hold investments through off-
shore accounts.9  Without proper support mechanisms for the overstretched tax 
administrators of these countries, it is difficult to constrain their citizens from evad-
ing domestic tax liability on capital income and closely held business income by 
using offshore accounts and offshore entities. 
In April 2009 leaders of the G20 countries10 declared that “[t]he era of bank-
ing secrecy is over,” and emphasized the importance of including developing coun-
tries in what they said would be “a new cooperative international tax environment.”11  
Since that time, a growing number of governments12 and nongovernmental organ-
izations13 have called for automatic exchange of tax information to address the 
taxation of offshore accounts.  Financial institutions have expressed interest in 
providing governments with automatic information on cross-border investors and 
their investment income, at least when promised relief from withholding tax for 
such investors.  The European Union’s Savings Directive resulted in a limited form 
of automatic information exchange among most EU countries, and proposals of 
the last few years would expand its scope.  FATCA,14 legislation enacted by the 
United States in 2010, will eventually require foreign financial institutions to report 
  
9. See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
10. The G20 comprises nineteen member countries and the European Union.  The members are 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the European Union.  Members, G20, http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/members 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
11. G20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—LONDON SUMMIT 
(2009) [hereinafter APRIL 2009 LONDON COMMUNIQUÉ], available at http://www.g20.utoronto. 
ca/2009/2009ifi.pdf. 
12. One of the strongest statements came from Indian Prime Minister Manhoman Singh, who suggested 
that the “G-20 countries should take the lead in agreeing to automatic exchange of tax related infor-
mation with each other . . . in the spirit of our London Summit [declaration] that ‘the era of bank 
secrecy is over.’”  PM Asks G-20 to Send Strong Message to Stop Tax Evasion, IBN LIVE, http://ibnlive. 
in.com/news/send-strong-message-on-tax-evasion-pm-to-g20/198996-2.html (last updated Nov. 
3, 2011). 
13. The Tax Justice Network has been particularly active and effective in encouraging civil society to focus 
on automatic exchange of tax information.  TAX JUST. NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
14. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010 (HIRE Act), Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–
535, 124 Stat. 71, 97–115; see infra note 98. 
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financial information about accounts held by specified U.S. persons or be subject 
to a punitive withholding tax.  Finally, the recently revised Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (Multilateral Convention) creates a po-
tential legal platform for multilateral automatic information exchange. 
In August 2011, however, both Germany and the United Kingdom signed 
treaties with Switzerland that reject automatic information exchange and substitute 
anonymous cross-border tax withholding.15  Austria and Switzerland reached a 
similar agreement in April 2012.16  Under these agreements, Swiss financial insti-
tutions will impose withholding tax on behalf of a foreign government and the Swiss 
government will remit that tax anonymously to the investors’ countries of residence 
without revealing the names of or other information regarding the account holders 
whose investment earnings give rise to these payments.  The Swiss agreements are 
important because more than 25 percent of the world’s offshore wealth is managed 
from Switzerland, while approximately another 25 percent of the world’s offshore 
wealth is managed from the United Kingdom and its dependencies.17  Switzerland 
often acts as a leader for offshore asset management centers, while Germany and 
the United Kingdom are among the few economic and financial centers with suf-
ficient leverage to exert pressure on governments that are home to important off-
shore asset managers.  The Swiss agreements, particularly if ratified, represent a 
major blow to multilateral automatic information reporting.  Bilateral anonymous 
  
15. See generally Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation, U.K.–Switz., Oct. 6, 2011 [hereinaf-
ter U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement], available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/ 
swiss.pdf; U.K.–Switz. Protocol Amendment, supra note 5; Mutual Agreement Implementing 
Article XVIII of the Protocol Signed on 20 March 2012, Amending the Agreement Between the 
Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 
Cooperation in the Area of Taxation, U.K.–Switz., Apr. 18, 2012 [hereinafter U.K.–Switz. Protocol 
Letters], available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/swiss-uk-letters.pdf (increasing the 
minimum rate payable from 19 percent to 21 percent and increasing the rate payable on £7 million or 
more to 41 percent).  See also Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft über Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und 
Finanzmarkt [Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation 
on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation and Financial Markets], Ger.–Switz., Sept. 21, 2011 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement], available at http://www.news.admin.ch/ 
NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/24360.pdf; Ger.–Switz. Protocol Amendment, supra note 5; 
Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5.  Additionally, it was announced on June 12, 
2012, that Italy and Switzerland are working to revise their double taxation agreement.  See SWISS 
FED. DEP’T OF FIN., SWITZERLAND–ITALY TAX DOSSIER (2012), available at http://www.news. 
admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/27146.pdf. 
16. See Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5. 
17. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 1, at 13. 
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withholding agreements are incompatible with a broadly multilateral automatic 
information exchange system. 
Together, the moves by governments and financial institutions toward auto-
matic information exchange and anonymous cross-border withholding represent 
an important shift for the international tax system.  Yet academic discourse has 
hardly addressed the emerging approaches for cross-border tax intermediation.18  
Practitioners and the press generally focus on a single emerging approach or occa-
sionally note that automatic information exchange and anonymous withholding 
are in conflict with one another.  The commonality between these systems is, 
however, as important as their differences: The emergence of the EU, Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Swiss, and U.S. ap-
proaches to cross-border tax administrative assistance has shifted the discourse of 
international tax cooperation from a dispute about whether financial institutions 
should function as cross-border tax intermediaries to a dispute about how financial 
institutions should perform that role. 
This Article makes three key contributions.  First, it highlights the common-
ality between automatic information exchange and anonymous withholding, and 
it argues that we are witnessing the birth of a new international regime in which fi-
  
18. The only article of which I am aware that addresses the differences between all the emerging infor-
mation reporting models in any detail is Stafford Smiley, Qualified Intermediaries, the EU Savings 
Directives, Trace—What Does FATCA Really Add?, CORP. TAX’N, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 20.  Although 
I disagree with certain of his conclusions, and he does not consider the clash with anonymous 
withholding, Smiley makes an important contribution to the literature.  In a recent article, Susan 
Morse compares FATCA’s approach to routing information reporting with the approach to routing 
information taken by the European Union’s Savings Directive.  She recommends simplifying 
FATCA diligence and reporting, making side payments to participating countries, and seeking 
intergovernmental cooperation by offering reciprocity.  Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The 
Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999101.  Richard Harvey wrote an article focused on FATCA’s 
implementation, but it does not discuss the international context or other emerging approaches.  J. 
Richard Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential Future, 57 VILL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1969123.  In late 2009 Jefferson VanderWolk wrote an insightful and prescient article suggesting that 
the change in international norms with respect to information exchange upon request was likely to be 
an initial stage in a process that would eventually result in broader and more automatic exchanges of 
information between tax authorities.  See generally Jefferson P. VanderWolk, The New World of Tax 
Information Exchange, 13 ASIA-PAC. J. TAX’N 166 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582452.  For an early paper emphasizing that “multilateral coordination 
has become necessary to achieve the effective international information exchanges required for 
residence-based taxation of [foreign portfolio] income,” and that “the threat of coordinated mul-
tilateral defensive measures may coerce tax havens into entering into information exchange agree-
ments with OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries,” see 
Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 579–
80 (2003). 
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nancial institutions act as cross-border tax intermediaries with respect to offshore 
accounts.19  Second, it explains why automatic information reporting solutions are 
preferable to anonymous withholding solutions.20  Finally, this Article begins to 
address how to reconcile the emerging and incongruent proposals for automatic 
information reporting in a manner that will promote the emergence of a multilat-
eral automatic information reporting system. 
Part I of this Article introduces the events that catalyzed the present evolu-
tionary moment in cross-border tax cooperation and describes why the push for 
greater transparency to address offshore tax evasion may be even more important 
to emerging and developing economies than it is to developed economies.  Part II 
describes the nascent approaches to cross-border tax cooperation being developed 
by the European Union, the OECD, Switzerland, and the United States.  It argues 
that all of these approaches build on the premise that financial institutions should 
be cross-border tax intermediaries.  The fact that both government and private sec-
tor expectations are converging around this premise marks the emergence of a new 
regime. 
Part III argues that the automatic information reporting model is superior to 
the anonymous withholding model.  Automatic information reporting solutions 
can address concerns regarding the accretion of untaxed principal, whereas anon-
ymous withholding solutions cannot.  Automatic information reporting also un-
dergirds voluntary compliance by preserving tax morale, maintains expressive values 
associated with the taxation of capital income, and supports government policy 
flexibility, particularly outside the large developed economies.21  Finally, unlike 
anonymous withholding, an automatic information reporting solution has the ca-
pacity to develop into a broadly multilateral regime. 
  
19. I employ Stephen Krasner’s classic definition of “international regime”: “implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations.”  Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 186 (1982). 
20. From a tax administrator’s perspective, this comparison is between two second-best alternatives.  The 
ideal compliance system would provide for both nonanonymous withholding and information 
reporting.  This Article does not address that possibility because it is not presently under consider-
ation internationally. 
21. Some might query the degree to which the tax and development literature supports progressive 
personal income taxation and challenge the recommendations of this Article on those grounds.  See 
generally Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal 
Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005).  If administration were less of a 
concern because of improved global cooperation, however, then scholars with concerns regarding 
administrability might be more likely to endorse schedular income taxation of capital income by 
developing countries, at least at the top of the income distribution, as one part of a broader strategy to 
address inequality.  See id. at 1659–60, 1689–92. 
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The development of the new regime is likely to be path dependent, however, 
and bilateral anonymous withholding along with limited use of automatic infor-
mation exchange may be the most likely default.  A critical mass of anonymous 
withholding agreements would likely produce a suboptimal equilibrium that would 
allow only a limited group of countries to reap benefits from financial institutions 
functioning as cross-border tax intermediaries.  Thus, the emergence of a multi-
lateral automatic information reporting system requires progress in the near to me-
dium term before an anonymous withholding system becomes ensconced. 
At present it remains unclear whether the world is on the path toward au-
tomatic information exchange, anonymous withholding, or some combination 
thereof.  Part IV provides proposals as to how the emerging information reporting 
models could be harmonized to encourage the development of a multilateral au-
tomatic information exchange system.  It also proposes safeguards to address 
concerns that information exchanged automatically might be misused in some 
countries.22 
I. THE BEGINNING OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
IN CROSS-BORDER TAX ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE 
A. Information Exchange Upon Request and Its Inadequacy 
Most governments of major developed countries agree that access to infor-
mation from other countries is vital to the full and fair enforcement of their tax 
laws.23  Consequently, bilateral tax treaties generally provide for information ex-
  
22. By studying a particular problem in international tax diplomacy and regime conflict, this Article is also 
responsive to Diane Ring’s observation that the international tax literature lacks such scholarship 
and could greatly benefit from it.  Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 
TAX L. REV. 83 (2007). 
23. For example, over the years the International Tax Counsel of the United States have consistently 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that access to information from other coun-
tries is critically important to U.S. tax law enforcement.  See, e.g., Tax Convention With the United 
Kingdom (T.Doc. 107-19) and Protocols Amending Tax Conventions With Australia (T. Doc. 107-20) 
and Mexico (T. Doc. 108-3): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) 
(statement of Barbara M. Angus, Int’l Tax Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury) (“Because access to 
information from other countries is critically important to the full and fair enforcement of the U.S. tax 
laws, information exchange is a priority for the United States in its tax treaty program.  If a country has 
bank secrecy rules that would prevent or seriously inhibit the appropriate exchange of information 
under a tax treaty, we will not conclude a treaty with that country.  [I]t is one of a very few matters that 
we consider non-negotiable.”); Treaty Doc. 112-01: Protocol Amending Tax Convention With Swiss 
Confederation; Treaty Doc. 111-08: Protocol Amending Tax Convention With Luxembourg; Treaty Doc. 
111-07: Tax Convention With Hungary; Treaty Doc. 110-23: Investment Treaty With Rwanda; Treaty 
Doc. 111-06: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty With Bermuda: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
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change between tax authorities.  Such provisions have appeared in tax treaties since 
at least World War II.24  However, the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD 
Model Treaty), the world’s dominant model tax treaty, requires information ex-
change only upon request, while permitting but not requiring automatic infor-
mation exchange.25  The OECD’s standards do not permit “fishing expeditions” in 
a request for information from one country to another.  Until very recently, that 
limitation was understood to allow only requests about specific taxpayers, identified 
by name, in circumstances in which the requesting government could explain why 
it had reason to suspect it needed information about that taxpayer’s affairs.26 
Prior to 2009, the major developed economies and the OECD were ham-
strung in their efforts to achieve comprehensive information exchange upon re-
  
Relations, 111th Cong. (2011) (statement of Manal Corwin, Int’l Tax Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury). 
24. See Steven Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605, 648–53 
(2008) (describing bilateral tax information exchange upon request as a barter system that allows pairs 
of governments to barter with one another for information that each can use to enforce their own taxes 
and exploring the possibility of a market for cross-border tax information in which governments could 
buy and sell taxpayer information for consideration other than reciprocity). 
25. OECD, ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME 
AND ON CAPITAL art. 26 (2008) [hereinafter OECD MODEL CONVENTION].  Both the OECD’s 
Model Convention and Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement (for countries wishing to 
agree to tax information exchange without a broader tax treaty) require information exchange upon 
request.  International standards in this area were developed by the OECD and eventually endorsed by 
the G8, the G20, and the United Nations (U.N.), leading the OECD to describe the results as repre-
senting international standards for transparency and exchange of tax information.  These standards 
require (1) information exchange upon request where it is “foreseeably relevant” to the administra-
tion and enforcement of the treaty partner’s domestic laws, (2) no restrictions on exchange caused 
by bank secrecy or domestic tax interest requirements, (3) availability of reliable information and 
power to obtain that information, (4) respect for taxpayers’ rights, and (5) ensuring that information 
that is exchanged remains strictly confidential.  OECD, OVERVIEW OF THE OECD’S WORK ON 
COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION (2009) [hereinafter OECD, COUNTERING 
INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION].   
26. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 25, art. 26.  Compare OECD, AGREEMENT ON 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS art. 5 [hereinafter OECD TIEA], available 
at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmfultaxpractices/2082215.pdf, with OECD, UPDATE TO ARTICLE 
26 OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION AND ITS COMMENTARY ¶ 5.2 [hereinafter 
OECD, 2012 UPDATE], available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/latest 
documents/120718_Article 26-ENG_no cover (2).pdf.  Under the revised commentary to Article 26 
of the OECD Model Convention released on July 17, 2012, a request for information relating to a 
group of unidentified taxpayers will be viewed as a “fishing expedition”—that is, speculative and 
lacking nexus—unless the requesting state can provide the following to the requested state: (1) a 
detailed description of the group, (2) the specific facts and circumstances underlying the request, (3) 
an explanation of the applicable law, and (4) “why there is reason to believe that the taxpayers in the 
group for whom information is requested have been non-compliant with that law supported by a 
clear factual basis.”  Furthermore, the requesting state must show that the requested information 
“would assist” in determining whether the taxpayers in the group complied with the tax law. 
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quest.  The chief obstacle was that four OECD member states—Austria, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland—were committed to bank secrecy as a bar 
to tax information exchange upon request.27  One of the countries, Switzerland, 
is the location of more than 25 percent of the global offshore wealth manage-
ment industry as measured by assets under management,28 and the others also 
have important histories as offshore banking centers.  Significant non-OECD fi-
nancial centers (such as Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, Panama, and Singapore) felt 
comfortable following the lead of Switzerland and the other OECD bank secrecy 
jurisdictions in rejecting exchange upon request of bank information. 
In 2008, however, the issue of offshore tax evasion moved high on the glob-
al political agenda, largely as a result of two notable scandals.  The first of these 
scandals resulted in prosecutions for tax evasion through accounts held at LGT 
bank in Lichtenstein, primarily against residents of Germany and other large Eu-
ropean countries.29  The second scandal led the United States to act against UBS 
for conspiring to defraud it by helping U.S. customers conceal their ownership of, 
or beneficial interest in, income and assets held through offshore accounts in 
Switzerland and other jurisdictions.30  Responding to a widespread understand-
ing that LGT and UBS were merely exemplars of a much broader problem, world 
leaders at the April 2009 G20 London Summit stated that they “stand ready to 
take agreed action against those jurisdictions which do not meet international 
standards in relation to tax transparency.”31  The G20 called attention to a docu-
ment the OECD published on the same day as the London Summit that listed 
countries that had not committed to or substantially implemented international 
  
27. Historically, the OECD had pressured nonmembers to conform to high standards regarding tax 
information exchange but, given its consensus-based system for agreement among member countries, 
found it difficult to pressure its own four bank secrecy jurisdictions.  Statements regarding the impor-
tance of information exchange and compliance with international standards could not hide the fact 
that there was no true consensus among developed governments as to how to manage their own outli-
ers (such as Austria and Switzerland) on this issue.  The unwillingness or inability of the major de-
veloped economies to confront fellow OECD members sparked understandable calls of hypocrisy 
from other offshore financial centers during the late 1990s in the course of the OECD’s efforts to 
combat so-called harmful tax competition.  Those outcries were effective in limiting pressure on juris-
dictions opposed to liberal global tax information exchange rules. 
28. See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 1, at 13. 
29. See Lynnley Browning, Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at C8; 
Investigators Find ‘Immense’ Evasion: Over 160 Tax Dodgers Confess in Liechtenstein Probe, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L, Feb. 26, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,537839,00. 
html; Liechtenstein Tax Evasion Scandal: Informant in German Investigation ‘Fears’ for His Life, supra 
note 2. 
30. DOJ Announces Deferred Prosecution Agreement With UBS, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 19, 2009, 
available at LEXIS, 2009 TNT 31-32. 
31. APRIL 2009 LONDON COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 11, at 4. 
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standards for tax transparency.  For the first time, such an OECD list included the 
bank secrecy countries that were OECD members.32 
The April 2009 G20 Summit and OECD list catalyzed the present evolu-
tionary moment in cross-border administrative assistance for tax purposes.33  
Within a few years of being threatened with sanctions by the G20, those jurisdic-
tions previously unwilling to exchange information upon request in accordance 
with OECD standards changed their position and began to comply with this new 
global norm.  However, information exchange upon request is, on its own, inade-
quate to combat offshore tax evasion.  The ability to request information regardless 
of bank secrecy does have some chilling effect on tax evasion because evaders 
cannot rely on bank secrecy to conceal their activities.  At the same time, to receive 
information upon request, a tax administration was traditionally required to name 
the taxpayer, to know which jurisdiction to ask for information, to know at which 
financial institution a taxpayer may hold her account, and to have a credible suspi-
cion of tax evasion.34  Otherwise, the request could be denied as a “fishing expedi-
tion.”  A requirement that a requesting tax administration have such specific and 
detailed information limits the effectiveness of information exchange upon request 
as a means to combat offshore tax evasion systematically.35 
Recent actions by legislatures, tax administrations, and prosecutors of the 
world’s major developed economies demonstrate their belief that information ex-
change upon request is inadequate to fight offshore tax evasion.  Various G7 gov-
ernments have purchased account data stolen by insiders from banks,36 shared 
stolen information among themselves and used it to prosecute tax evaders,37 re-
  
32. Id. at 4. 
33. Following the release of the G20 communiqué, previously recalcitrant jurisdictions made formal 
commitments to the OECD information exchange upon request standard and shortly thereafter 
began passing legislation to implement their stated commitments.  See, e.g., David Crawford & Jesse 
Drucker, Swiss to Relax Bank Secrecy Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123694252262918343.html. 
34. OECD TIEA, supra note 26, art. 5(5); see also OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 25, art. 26. 
35. See John Christensen & David Spencer, Stop This Timidity in Ending Tax Haven Abuse, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2008, at 13, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63cdb642-ea03-11dc-b3c9-
0000779fd2ac.html.  But see OECD, 2012 UPDATE, supra note 26, ¶ 5.2 (changing the Commentary 
to Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention explicitly to authorize requests relating to a group of 
unidentified taxpayers in certain circumstances).  
36. See Carter Dougherty & Mark Landler, Tax Scandal in Germany Fans Complaints of Inequality, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/worldbusiness/18tax.html. 
37. See H. Arnold Sherman, The War on Offshore Tax Evasion, STEP J., Sept. 2010, http://www. 
stepjournal.org/journal_archive/2010/step_journal_september_2010/the_war_on_offshore_tax.aspx 
(noting that the American, French, and German tax authorities have all used stolen information pur-
chased from employees of foreign banks to prosecute taxpayers evading domestic tax obligations). 
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quired foreign banks to report on or close their residents’ accounts,38 opened up in-
vestigations of and prosecuted financial institutions with large offshore asset man-
agement businesses,39 entered agreements to require anonymous withholding on 
their residents’ offshore accounts,40 demanded automatic information reporting,41 
and linked enhanced penalties for offshore tax evasion by their citizens to the tax 
transparency of the territory in which the income or gain arises.42  These unilateral 
techniques, while somewhat effective, often are not available to less powerful coun-
tries looking to address their own offshore tax evasion concerns. 
B. Emerging and Developing Economies Are Most Exposed 
The best available data suggests that compliance concerns over tax evasion 
through offshore accounts are likely to be greater for emerging and developing 
economies than for developed economies.  Meanwhile, lower administrative ca-
pacity in emerging and developing economies can reduce the efficacy of infor-
mation exchange upon request as a tool with which those countries combat offshore 
tax evasion.  They often lack the audit and investigative skills to determine which 
country to ask about which resident taxpayer. 
Offshore wealth represents 6.4 percent of the more than $120 trillion of glob-
al wealth.43  However, the extent to which taxpayers’ assets are managed offshore 
  
38. See Joint Declaration by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs Concerning the Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Cooperation in 
Tax Matters, Liech.–U.K., Aug. 11, 2009, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/international/ 
joint-declaration-lich.pdf.  The United Kingdom entered into a treaty in which Liechtenstein, under 
pressure, agreed that financial intermediaries in Liechtenstein will identify persons who may be liable 
to tax in the United Kingdom and either obtain certification that such person is compliant with their 
U.K. tax obligations or close the account.  Somewhat similarly, FATCA requires foreign financial 
institutions to report on, withhold on, or close U.S. accounts. 
39. Randall Jackson, U.S. Offers 11 Swiss Banks Deals to End Tax Evasion Investigation, 134 TAX NOTES 
71 (2012). 
40. U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra 
note 15. 
41. See, e.g., Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010 (HIRE Act), Pub. L. No. 111-47, §§ 
501–535, 124 Stat. 71, 97–115 (“Foreign Account Tax Compliance”); Council Directive 2011/16/EU, 
Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation and Repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, 2011 
O.J. (L 64) 1 [hereinafter February Directive]; see also PM Asks G-20 to Send Strong Message to Stop Tax 
Evasion, supra note 12. 
42. See, e.g., Finance Act, 2010, c. 13, § 35, sch. 10 (U.K.). 
43. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 1, at 13.  BCG estimates that global wealth at the end of 2010 
stood at $121.8 trillion.  Households outside the major developed economies hold approximately 25 
percent of global wealth, with $21.7 trillion in wealth held by households in Asia and the Pacific, ex-
cluding Japan, $4.5 trillion in the Middle East and Africa, and $3.5 trillion in Latin America (defined 
to include Mexico).  Global wealth for this purpose includes all assets under management across all 
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is not uniform across regions of the world.  Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has 
estimated that less than 2 percent of North American wealth and less than 8 
percent of European wealth is held offshore.44  In contrast, more than 25 percent of 
all Latin American household wealth, representing $900 billion, and almost 33 
percent of all Middle Eastern and African wealth, representing $1.4 trillion, is held 
offshore.45  Households outside the major developed economies hold approximate-
ly 25 percent of global wealth (including $21.7 trillion in wealth for households in 
Asia and the Pacific, excluding Japan).46  Wealth is also much more concentrated47 
and growing at a significantly faster rate outside North America, Japan, and 
Western Europe, with experts expecting that trend to continue.48  Thus, the taxa-
tion of offshore wealth should be of greater relative importance to Latin America, 
the Middle East, and Africa than to the United States and Canada or to the ma-
jor European economies.  Data on actual revenues lost by developing countries and 
emerging economies overall from offshore tax evasion are unreliable.  However, 
OECD officials have stated that revenue losses, only a portion of which are at-
tributed to the use of offshore accounts by resident individuals, may be of a magni-
tude that approximates all official development assistance worldwide (totaling $120 
billion per year).49 
  
households worldwide, including worldwide cash deposits, money market funds, and listed securities 
held directly or indirectly through managed investments, and it includes all onshore and offshore 
assets.  It excludes wealth attributed to individuals’ own businesses, residences, or luxury goods.  The 
major developed economies are Canada, Europe, Japan, and the United States.  Id. at 5, 7 & n.3. 
44. In all, $0.7 trillion of $38.2 trillion in North American wealth is held offshore, representing 2 percent 
of North American wealth.  Three trillion dollars in European wealth is held offshore, representing 
8 percent of European wealth.  Id. at 7, 13. 
45. Id. at 5, 7 & n.3. 
46. Id. at 7. 
47. In Europe, for example, 1.1 percent of households held more than $1 million in assets under man-
agement, representing in total 26 percent of European wealth.  Id. at 8.  In contrast, in Latin America, 
0.24 percent of households held more than $1 million in assets under management, representing 36 
percent of total Latin American wealth, and in the Middle East and Africa, 0.3 percent of households 
held more than $1 million in assets under management, representing 45 percent of total Middle 
Eastern and African wealth.  Id. 
48. See id. at 10; see also MERRILL LYNCH & CAP GEMINI, WORLD WEALTH REPORT 6 (2011). 
49. Remarks of Jeffrey Owens, Dir. of the Centre for Tax Policy and Admin. of the OECD, 
Meeting of the OECD’s Informal Task Force on Tax and Development (May 10–11, 2010) (au-
thor’s notes and discussions with attendees) (suggesting that revenue losses may equal the sum spent 
on official development assistance worldwide; note that Mr. Owens has since retired from the Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration); see also OECD DEV. ASSISTANCE COMM., REFLECTION 
EXERCISE: INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A COMMON CAUSE IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 
(2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/1/43854787.pdf (noting that official devel-
opment assistance totaled $120 billion in 2008).  Commentators estimate that offshore tax evasion in 
the developing world is much more extensive.  See, e.g., DEV KAR & DEVON CARTWRIGHT-SMITH, 
GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2002–
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Emerging economies’ concerns with offshore tax evasion are not limited to 
revenue loss.  As in the developed world, an inability to collect tax on income and 
wealth held through offshore accounts and entities may undermine tax morale 
and threaten the broader administration of the domestic tax system.  Moreover, in 
administrative regimes characterized by limited competence, widespread aware-
ness of evasion through offshore accounts by the wealthy or privileged may un-
dermine the authority and effectiveness of the state.  The Indian Supreme Court, 
which handled a series of cases associated with corruption and tax evasion in re-
cent years, described the problem thus: 
Unaccounted for monies, especially large sums held by nationals 
and entities with a legal presence in the nation, in banks abroad . . . would 
also indicate a substantial weakness in the capacity of the State in col-
lection of taxes on incomes generated by individuals and other legal en-
tities within the country.  The generation of such revenues is essential for 
the State to undertake the various public goods and services that it is 
constitutionally mandated, and normatively expected by its citizenry, to 
provide.  A substantial degree of incapacity, in the above respect, would 
be an indicia of the degree of failure of the State; and beyond a particu-
lar point, the State may spin into a vicious cycle of declining moral au-
thority, thereby causing the incidence of unlawful activities in which 
wealth is sought to be generated, as well as instances of tax evasion, to 
increase in volume and in intensity.50 
II. BEYOND INFORMATION EXCHANGE UPON REQUEST 
At the start of the twenty-first century, outside of information exchange upon 
request, there were few mechanisms in place by which governments or financial 
institutions automatically provided effective assistance to a foreign sovereign at-
tempting to tax assets held offshore by the foreign sovereign’s residents.51  This sit-
  
2006 (2009) (estimating illicit financial flows out of developing countries at $850 billion to $1 
trillion each year).  Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel are skeptical of the higher figures, however, 
and further conclude that “most existing estimates of tax revenue losses in developing countries due to 
evasion and avoidance are not based on reliable methods and data.”  CLEMENS FUEST & NADINE 
RIEDEL, TAX EVASION, TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EXPENDITURES IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, at vi (2009) (emphasis omitted). 
50. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 S.C.C. 1, 14 (India). 
51. For example, Australia, now an international leader in unilaterally and automatically supplying other 
jurisdictions with usable resident taxpayer information, engaged in its first automatic exchange of 
information in 2000.  See AUSTL. NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, AUDIT REPORT NO. 34 2009–10, THE 
MANAGEMENT AND USE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT INFORMATION COLLECTED 
THROUGH AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE 37 (2010), available at http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/ 
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uation persisted despite the fact that financial institutions had served as tax inter-
mediaries domestically in almost all major developed economies for decades and 
despite large, wealthy economies’ longstanding concerns about evasion of domestic 
taxes through offshore accounts.52  Even within the European Union, a sui generis 
pooling of sovereignty with significant interstate cooperation, debates about rou-
tine cooperation on the taxation of a single category of income—interest—did not 
progress for decades.53  Germany, the European Union’s most powerful govern-
ment, was forced to change its regime for taxing capital income when its citizens 
found it too easy and tempting to evade German taxes by holding assets through a 
foreign account in another EU jurisdiction.54 
Some discussions in the late 1990s suggested small steps toward improving 
the availability of bank information for cross-border tax purposes,55 but progress in 
  
documents/2009-10_Audit_Report%20_34.pdf.  One noteworthy exception was U.S. reporting to 
Canada regarding bank deposit interest and reciprocal Canadian reporting to the United States with 
respect to financial payments made to any person disclosing a permanent U.S. address.  Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6049-8 (as amended in 1997).  There were also certain other routine information exchanges relat-
ing to certain passive income flows, often providing bulk data that was not attributable to any given 
taxpayer or was otherwise unusable. 
52. At least as early as 1970, the U.S. Congress was concerned about the issue, as it noted in a congres-
sional report accompanying the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 
Stat. 1114, which stated: “[T]hese days when the citizens of this country are crying out for tax reform 
and relief, it is grossly unfair to leave the secret foreign bank account open as a convenient avenue of tax 
evasion.”  H.R. REP. NO. 91-975, at 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4397; see also 
Thomas Rixen & Peter Schwarz, How Effective Is the European Union’s Savings Tax Directive? 
Evidence From Four EU Member States, 50 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 151, 152 (2012) (arguing 
that agreement on the EU Savings Directive in 2003 was the product of thirty-five years of negoti-
ations).  Indeed, French concerns with tax evasion through Swiss banks predate World War II.  See 
Débats Parlementaires, No. 87, Chambre des Députés, Séance du 10 novembre 1932, 1932 J.O. 
2997.  Note that the OECD developed the first paper-based protocol for automatic information 
exchange in 1981.  OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning a Standardised Form for Automatic 
Exchanges of Information Under International Tax Agreements, OECD Doc. C(81)39/FINAL (May 
5, 1981). 
53. See, e.g., Charles-Henry Courtois, The Impact of the European Commission on the Council of Ministers’ 
Decisions in the Field of European Taxation: The Case of the European Savings Directive, 2 INT’L PUB. 
POL’Y REV. 26, 30 (2006); Alex Easson, The Tax Competition Controversy, 18 TAX NOTES INT’L 
371, 371 (1999) (describing how a 1989 EU Commission predecessor proposal to the Savings 
Directive was “quickly dropped”). 
54. Germany saw a major outflow of domestic capital to Luxembourg and other European states after 
imposing a withholding tax on domestic interest income and was forced to repeal that tax to staunch 
the losses.  See Courtois, supra note 53; see also Claudio M. Radaelli, Harmful Tax Competition in the 
EU: Policy Narratives and Advocacy Coalitions, 37 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 661 (1999). 
55. See OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES (2000), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/7/2497487.pdf; OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf. 
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this direction was limited.56  In the early years of the twenty-first century, hopes of 
grander collective steps proved largely illusory.  The most important nascent exam-
ple of automatic cooperation with respect to bank information was the European 
Union’s Savings Directive (EUSD).  That directive became effective in 2005 and 
requires financial institutions in a specific subset of jurisdictions to report infor-
mation on certain interest income (and only interest income) paid to EU residents 
who reside in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction where the financial institu-
tion is located.57  Scholars believed that it could be a forerunner of broader interna-
tional cooperation, but that hope had yet to be realized.58 
In the last few years, the global landscape has changed radically.  Interest in 
systematic, automatic information exchange grew in parallel to the mounting uni-
versal acceptance of information exchange upon request as a global norm.  The 
OECD’s work on standard transmission formats created a progressively more ef-
fective technical platform for automatic information exchange that govern-
ments are increasingly using in ad hoc bilateral exchanges, and an update of 
the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (Multilateral 
Convention) created a viable legal framework for multilateral information ex-
change.59  Meanwhile, since 2007, three concrete models for automatic infor-
mation exchange have emerged: the OECD’s authorized-intermediary project, 
  
56. See, e.g., Angel Gurría, Secretary-Gen., OECD, Address at the Parliamentary Assembly Session of 
the Council of Europe (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://hub.coe.int/parliamentary-assembly-
sessions/all-session-news-october-2010/statement-by-angel-gurria (“[W]e have achieved important 
breakthroughs in combating tax evasion.  This includes the exchange of information for tax purposes, 
where we have made more progress in the past two years than in the previous ten.”). 
57. A European Union directive is a non-self-executing legislative act of the Institutions of the European 
Union that European Union member states must implement, whether by national legislation or by 
regulatory action.  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, art. 249, 2007 O.J. (C 306). 
58. See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 18, at 585. 
59. See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Use of Tax Identification Numbers in an 
International Context, OECD Doc. C(97)29/FINAL (Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter OECD, 
Recommendation on Tax Identification Numbers]; OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Use of 
the Revised OECD Standard Magnetic Format for Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD Doc. 
C(97)30/FINAL (Mar. 13, 1997); OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Use of the OECD 
Model Memorandum of Understanding on Automatic Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, 
OECD Doc. C(2001)28/FINAL (Mar. 22, 2001); Tool Kit on Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_33767_40499474_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2012).  A number of bilateral electronic automatic information exchange relationships 
were established beginning in the early 2000s, but the types of data exchanged were highly variable 
and the ability to match the data to taxpayer records was initially quite poor.  The last few years have 
seen an increase in both the number of automatic information exchange relationships and the quality 
of taxpayer matching for automatically exchanged information.  See, e.g., AUSTL. NAT’L AUDIT 
OFFICE, supra note 51, at 93–95. 
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the European Union’s Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of 
Taxation and its proposed revision of the EUSD, and the United States’s FATCA 
legislation.  These models demonstrate how information on investment income 
earned through offshore accounts60 could flow automatically from financial institu-
tions to residence country governments, thereby facilitating enforcement of resi-
dence country tax burdens on income earned through offshore accounts. 
The only academic commentator who compares all three emerging models 
for systematic, automatic information exchange describes the models as competing 
with one another.61  A fourth model, the Swiss anonymous withholding model, 
presents an even sharper contrast.  Instead of offering an information reporting so-
lution, this approach emphasizes anonymity in combination with a withholding 
regime for collecting revenue from nonresident account holders.62 
However, focusing on the inconsistencies and conflicts between the emerging 
systems obscures their commonality, which is more important than their differ-
ences.  All four models share a key feature that the literature has yet to recognize: 
Each requires domestic financial institutions to routinely provide cross-border ad-
ministrative assistance to sovereigns outside the country in which the financial in-
stitution is located and thereby to serve as cross-border tax intermediaries.  This 
alone is a critically important achievement.  For years, financial institutions have 
acted as domestic tax intermediaries by providing information reporting on their 
domestic payees to the tax administration of the payees’ respective countries of res-
idence, by withholding from such payees and remitting the withheld amounts to 
the domestic tax administration, or both.  But even five years ago, no one would 
have claimed that financial institutions were obligated to act as cross-border tax in-
termediaries or that there was an emerging consensus that they do so.  Countries 
are now agreeing to a higher level of international tax cooperation and demanding 
that multinational financial institutions play an additional role in tax collection.  
In some sense this may be a reclamation of sovereign authority over cross-border 
asset management; in another sense it acknowledges that multinational financial 
institutions must play a more extensive role in tax collection in a globalized economy. 
  
60. I use the term “offshore account” to refer to any account through which investments are intermediated 
on behalf of an individual who is not a tax resident of the jurisdiction in which the institution that 
provides the financial intermediation services (or the relevant subsidiary or branch of such institution) 
resides. 
61. See Smiley, supra note 18. 
62. See infra notes 115–127 and accompanying text. 
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A. Background: Source-Country Taxation and Financial Intermediation 
This Part introduces nomenclature used throughout the Article and describes 
the United States’s qualified intermediary system (QI).  It begins with a simplified 
example of how modern financial intermediation of cross-border portfolio invest-
ment works.  The example is intended to help readers understand the details of the 
various emerging information exchange approaches discussed in Part II.B and 
thereafter.  This Part then addresses QI, which began operating in 2001 and was 
primarily intended to ensure that the United States properly taxed non-U.S. 
persons making portfolio investments in the United States on income from those 
investments.  QI was therefore directed at taxation of U.S.-source income received 
by foreigners (“source-country taxation”) rather than at the problem of taxing U.S. 
citizens and residents on investments made through foreign financial institutions (a 
part of “residence country taxation”).  In this sense, QI is not a precursor to the 
emerging approaches to cross-border administrative assistance, each of which 
addresses residence country concerns with respect to cross-border tax evasion.  Still, 
QI is relevant historically because (1) it marked the first time financial institutions 
routinely acted as cross-border tax intermediaries, (2) it provided one of the con-
ceptual seeds for the anonymous withholding approach currently being promoted 
by Switzerland as a means to address residence country tax concerns, and (3) the 
OECD’s authorized-intermediary project, discussed in Part II.B, started with a QI 
model, although it ultimately developed an approach that is more responsive to res-
idence country tax enforcement concerns. 
1. Cross-Border Portfolio Investment and Source-Country Taxation 
Host-country tax on nonresidents who make portfolio investments in securi-
ties63 issued by an entity in that country (the “source country”) is usually assessed by 
means of a tax that a domestic payor is required to withhold from gross payments 
made to foreign investors (“withholding taxes”).  Like most countries, the United 
States imposes a withholding tax on portfolio dividends (30 percent under U.S. 
law64) and then reduces that tax rate under bilateral treaties, but only when a quali-
fying resident of the treaty country beneficially owns the dividend.65  As a result, 
  
63. These portfolio investments include small investments in debt and equity securities by noninstitu-
tional investors. 
64. I.R.C. § 871 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
65. See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, art. 10, at 16–17 (2006) 
[hereinafter U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION], available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf. 
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different rates of withholding tax apply to different foreign investors depending on 
where they reside and whether they are eligible for the benefits of a treaty. 
This administrative challenge is exacerbated by the highly intermediated na-
ture of modern cross-border portfolio investment.  A simplified example both il-
lustrates the problem and introduces key terminology.  A typical investment made 
by an Indian national in a U.S. company can involve the Indian national providing 
funds to Singapore Bank A, which in turn provides those funds to Singapore Bank 
B, which in turn provides the funds to U.S. Bank C, which then makes the invest-
ment in the U.S. company by holding shares through a central securities deposito-
ry, a type of clearinghouse for securities transactions (U.S. Clearinghouse).  Income 
from those investments will generally flow from the U.S. company to its paying 
agent, then on to the U.S. Clearinghouse, then to U.S. Bank C, on to Singapore 
Bank B, and from Singapore Bank B to Singapore Bank A, which will credit the 
relevant funds to the Indian national’s account.  In this example, India is the inves-
tor’s country of residence (residence country), the United States is the country 
that is the source of the income (source country), and Singapore is the country from 
which the assets are being managed (asset management country).66 
Absent some mechanism to provide more detailed information, only Singapore 
Bank A knows on which client’s behalf the given investment was made.  At every 
other stage in the process, the investment is generally made through so-called om-
nibus accounts that identify the financial institution from which the investment is 
received rather than the investor on whose behalf the investment is made.  No pri-
vate or public institution in either the residence country or the source country need 
know the identity of the client who is the beneficial owner of the investment. 
In this example, determining the tax rate that the United States should im-
pose on the income resulting from the investment is an aspect of source-country 
taxation.  The questions are whether the ultimate investor, the Indian national, is 
eligible for a reduction in withholding pursuant to a treaty between the United 
States and India, and how that information is taken into account by the U.S. payor 
that is responsible for imposing the proper withholding tax on a dividend payment 
it makes to Singapore Bank B.  It is important to note that the residence country 
taxation question—how India, the residence country, will effectively administer its 
  
66. To generalize more broadly, “[i]ncome payments arising from securities typically will flow from the 
issuer to its paying agent and from the paying agent through [multiple] intermediaries to the end 
investors.”  OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION 
OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-
BORDER INVESTORS ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR 
CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS 8 (2009) [hereinafter OECD, ICG REPORT], available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/19/41974569.pdf. 
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tax on the earnings from this investment by an Indian national, which will be 
earned through an account at Singapore Bank A—is entirely separate from the 
question of how the source country administers its withholding tax. 
2. The Qualified Intermediary System 
In the 1990s, the United States began to grapple with taxing growing flows of 
cross-border portfolio investments, including small investments in U.S. debt and 
equity securities by large numbers of noninstitutional investors.67  QI represented 
a bargain between the United States and non-U.S. financial institutions through 
which the United States addressed this challenge and ensured that the tax it impos-
es on nonresident portfolio investors is properly enforced.68  Under QI, non-U.S. 
financial institutions agree to collect information from their customers investing in 
the United States as to whether those customers are U.S. persons or non-U.S. 
persons and as to which of the non-U.S. persons are entitled to reduced rates of 
withholding tax.69  Before QI, there was no practical regime in place by which the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or U.S. withholding agents could make these de-
terminations.70  The United States provided non-U.S. financial institutions three 
inducements to cooperate with the new regime: (1) nonresident client anonymity 
from U.S. financial institutions (thus protecting their clients’ identities from their 
competitors), (2) anonymity from the IRS (thus ensuring that the IRS would not 
provide information to the tax administration of the investor’s country of resi-
dence), and (3) accurate and timely treaty benefits for non-U.S. persons. 
The QI rules were of particular importance to private banks engaged in asset 
management because a QI was able to conceal the identity of its non-U.S. custom-
ers from both competitor institutions and the IRS.  As a result, a QI could ensure 
that other financial institutions in the chain of intermediation would not be able to 
steal its customers and could assure its customers that the IRS would not provide 
  
67. See, e.g., William L. Burke, Tax Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-Border Context, 27 
VA. TAX REV. 399, 403–04 & n.11, 407–08 & n.22 (2007). 
68. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-99, TAX COMPLIANCE: QUALIFIED 
INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM PROVIDES SOME ASSURANCE THAT TAXES ON FOREIGN 
INVESTORS ARE WITHHELD AND REPORTED, BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 12 (2008) [hereinafter 
GAO, QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM]. 
69. These reduced rates may be available under a tax treaty or a U.S. statutory rule.  For a thorough dis-
cussion of the QI rules as originally promulgated, see generally Carol Doran Klein & Diane L. 
Renfroe, The Final Withholding Regulations: A Rube Goldberg Contraption—Will It Work?, 27 TAX 
MGMT. INT’L J. 67 (1998). 
70. See Stephen E. Shay et al., “What’s Source Got to Do With It?” Source Rules and U.S. International 
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 122 (2002). 
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information to their home country’s tax authority.  After imposition of the QI 
rules, these benefits existed generally for QI institutions but not for non-QI insti-
tutions.  In the example, if Singapore Bank A is a QI, it determines the rate of U.S. 
withholding that should apply to the Indian national and informs Singapore Bank 
B as to the rate of withholding that should be applied to a pool of investments it is 
making on behalf of its customers through Singapore Bank B (including the Indian 
national’s investment).  It does not, however, provide Singapore Bank B with the 
Indian national’s identity.  Singapore Bank B then forwards the pooled infor-
mation on to U.S. Bank C, which uses that information to impose withholding tax.  
On the other hand, if Singapore Bank A did not agree to become a QI, new U.S. 
rules imposed at the same time as the QI system required the bank to collect infor-
mation from its non-U.S. customers who sought reduced withholding and to send 
that information up the chain of financial institutions and potentially all the way to 
the IRS.  As one group of prominent practitioners wrote in the late 1990s, “because 
of the relative secrecy benefits provided to non-U.S. citizens or residents, the fail-
ure of a private bank to qualify as a QI would put that bank in a competitive disad-
vantage in the marketplace.”71 
QI effectively became the first major operational example of a cross-border 
anonymous withholding regime.  Ten years after QI came into operation, howev-
er, the UBS scandal demonstrated the extent to which QI could be abused to facil-
itate U.S. residence country tax evasion by U.S. persons,72 even as it provided the 
IRS some assurance that source-country taxation of nonresidents was being col-
lected.73  The compromises made to launch the QI program and the consequent 
  
71. Thomas A. O’Donnell, Philip Marcovici & Marnin J. Michaels, The New U.S. Withholding Tax 
Régime: To Be or Not to Be, a “Qualified Intermediary,” 27 TAX PLANNING INT’L REV. 3, 4 (2000). 
72. The U.S. Justice Department has shown that United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) used QI status to 
suggest to U.S. clients that it was a more secure institution through which U.S. citizens could evade 
U.S. tax.  See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 18, 2009).  UBS then helped U.S. residents set up entity structures to avoid the reporting and 
withholding nominally required by QI with respect to U.S. persons’ investments back into the United 
States, thereby allowing them to achieve the anonymity with respect to U.S. investments that was 
supposed to be provided only to nonresident investors.  See id. at 2–4 (“Acceptance of Responsibility 
for Violation of Law”).  Hearings and investigations in Congress highlighted the inadequacy of the QI 
system as a backstop for U.S. residence country taxation.  See generally Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax 
Compliance: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
& Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008).  Sadly, the design features that produced these inadequacies were 
widely commented on and accepted by U.S. government officials as part of the bargain made with 
foreign financial intermediaries to improve U.S. source-country nonresident taxation.  See, e.g., Shay 
et al., supra note 70, at 125–26. 
73. GAO, QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM, supra note 68, at 6–11. 
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UBS scandal together laid the groundwork for the most recent U.S. legislation 
intended to address offshore tax evasion by U.S. persons. 
B. Emerging Approaches to Automatic Residence-Based Tax  
Information Exchange 
Cross-border information reporting models that are substantially focused on 
residence country taxation are emerging from the European Union, the OECD, 
and the United States.  This Part describes these models and their histories, 
highlighting that the new regime for financial institutions to serve as cross-border 
tax intermediaries emerged only in the last few years.  Three key features that dis-
tinguish these information reporting approaches from one another are (1) what in-
formation they require to be reported across borders (reporting), (2) how they route 
information from financial institutions to residence country governments (rout-
ing), and (3) what mechanisms they use to encourage financial institutions and 
governments to participate (incentives).  Understanding the alternative ways that 
the emerging information reporting models address reporting, routing, and incen-
tives is necessary to understand the comparison of information reporting to anon-
ymous withholding in Part III. 
Part IV, which provides some observations about the bases for a multilateral 
information reporting system, discusses how to reconcile the different reporting, 
routing, and incentives features in the emerging information exchange approaches.  
It also considers three further design features: (4) which financial institutions are 
included in the system (scope), (5) how the systems identify taxpayers and their 
countries of residence (identification), and (6) how the systems ensure that finan-
cial institutions comply with their rules (verification).  Together, identification, re-
porting, verification, scope, routing, and incentives constitute the six key features of 
any cross-border information reporting regime. 
1. The European Union 
In 1998 the EU Commission proposed a directive intended to ensure that a 
minimum effective tax rate was imposed on interest income earned through ac-
counts held by a resident taxpayer in a foreign EU country.74  After a few years of 
  
74. Having failed miserably in 1989 with a suggestion to impose a single 15 percent withholding tax on 
interest income across the European Union, in 1998 the EU Commission tried to focus exclusively 
on tax evasion associated with interest income.  Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System 
of Withholding Tax on Interest Income, COM (89) 60 final (Feb. 10, 1989) (proposing a Council 
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bitter debate between EU member states supporting bank secrecy and EU mem-
ber states supporting information exchange and a series of failed compromises, a 
proposal emerged.  Under the proposal, information exchange was treated as the 
preferred mechanism for reducing EU residents’ evasion of tax on interest income, 
but EU jurisdictions were allowed to impose a withholding tax during a so-called 
transitional period.  The European Union’s bank secrecy jurisdictions (Austria, 
Belgium,75 and Luxembourg), however, took the firm position that they would on-
ly agree to the proposal if both small banking centers like Liechtenstein and the 
Channel Islands, as well as major non-EU financial centers like Switzerland and 
the United States, agreed to adopt equivalent measures.76 
Non-EU financial centers were not amenable to the EU bank secrecy juris-
dictions’ demand.  Switzerland objected to any information exchange or withhold-
ing.  Meanwhile, the Clinton administration objected to the “implicit assumption 
that a withholding tax would be an adequate substitute for the exchange of infor-
mation.”77  Then in 2002 Glenn Hubbard, the chairman of the White House 
Council of Economic Advisers in the Bush administration, announced definitive-
ly that the United States would not agree to EU requests for across-the-board shar-
ing of information on U.S. savings accounts held by EU residents.78  By that point, 
  
Directive on a common system of withholding taxes levied on interest at a 15 percent rate within the 
European Economic Community).  The Commission described its 1998 proposal narrowly as a 
mechanism to address perceived economic distortions arising from nontaxation of cross-border 
interest payments made to individuals.  Id.; see also Courtois, supra note 53, at 31 (interviewing 
Commission staff on the history of the European Union Savings Directive (EUSD)). 
75. In 2010, Belgium began to exchange information rather than impose a withholding tax on interest 
income subject to the EUSD.  See Taxation and Customs Union: Rules Applicable, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/rules_applicable/index
_en.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
76. In June 2000 Luxembourg Prime Minister and Finance Minister Jean-Claude Juncker epitomized 
the EU bank secrecy jurisdictions’ unflinching opposition to cooperating in the absence of non-EU 
member cooperation by stating that “there would be blood on the table if certain other delegations do 
not change their point of view.”  George Peter Gilligan, Whither or Wither the European Savings Tax 
Directive? A Case Study in the Political Economy of Taxation, 11 J. FIN. CRIME 56, 59 (2003). 
77. Albertina M. Fernández & Thomas F. Field, Canadian Tax Foundation Holds First World Tax 
Conference, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 1056, 1056 (2000) (quoting Phillip West, Int’l Tax Counsel of the 
U.S., Address at the World Tax Conference in Tampa Bay, Fla.: Taxes Without Borders (Feb. 26–
Mar. 1, 2000)).  The public record suggests that during this period significant discussions between the 
United States and the European Union regarding cross-border administrative assistance may have 
occurred.  It is possible that some U.S. officials may have been prepared to contemplate reciprocity if 
the European Union moved to an information reporting system rather than an anonymous withhold-
ing system or a system that accepted either anonymous withholding or automatic information re-
porting.  Whatever policymakers’ intentions, no progress was made. 
78. Edward Alden et al., US Endangers Brown Saving Tax Plan, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at 1.  In 
August of 2002 the Bush administration withdrew proposed regulations issued in the Clinton ad-
ministration’s final days, Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 66 
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the continuing EUSD debate was mostly about the parameters of an ever-closer 
European Union.79  Broader acceptance of financial institutions as cross-border tax 
intermediaries did not appear to be forthcoming. 
In mid-2003 the European Union agreed to forge ahead internally on a ver-
sion of the EUSD that would apply after 2005 and was intended to meet the rela-
tively narrow goal of ensuring information reporting or withholding on interest 
payments earned by EU residents holding, in their own names as individuals, ac-
counts earning interest at financial institutions within Europe.80  If an EU country 
exchanges information under the EUSD, financial institutions in that country re-
port information to the tax administration of the EU member state where the fi-
nancial institution is resident and then relevant information is routed from that tax 
administration to the tax administration of the member state where an account 
holder is resident.81 
The EUSD mandates only that member states either exchange information 
with one another or impose a withholding tax to be deducted from interest income 
for so long as an indefinite “transitional period” continues.82  Most EU countries 
  
Fed. Reg. 3925 (proposed Jan. 17, 2001), that would have required U.S. banks to collect and report to 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) information generally of the type needed to join the Savings 
Directive.  See 67 Fed. Reg. 50,386 (Aug. 2, 2002) (withdrawing and re-proposing the bank deposit 
interest regulations).  Initially, those regulations were replaced with proposed regulations that would 
have required the collection of bank deposit interest information for nonresident alien individuals that 
were residents of certain designated countries, including some (but not all) members of the European 
Union.  The Bush administration did not finalize the revised proposed regulations and they never 
came into effect. 
79. The other question was the relationship of European Free Trade Association countries like 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland to the European Union. 
80. The EUSD was agreed among EU member states on June 3, 2003, and came into force on January 1, 
2005.  Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest 
Payments, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38, 38, 45 [hereinafter EUSD].  EU member states agreed that for the 
EUSD to apply to and be a meaningful enforcement measure for offshore accounts it was necessary 
that at least six non-EU countries (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, and 
the United States) also comply with the EUSD.  Nevertheless, they made the EUSD effective 
beginning in 2005, provided that Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland, but 
not the United States, met certain conditions.  Id. at 45. 
81. The EUSD’s information exchange component built on foundational work done at the OECD that 
was intended to create a toolkit for tax administrators to adopt automatic information exchange.  See 
OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 25, art. 26. 
82. Jurisdictions opting for the so-called transitional withholding tax system share the revenue with the 
country of residence (handing over 75 percent of receipts and keeping 25 percent of receipts).  EUSD, 
supra note 80, at 44.  The withholding tax option initially was assessed at a rate of 15 percent, with a 
schedule that increased the rate to 35 percent after June 30, 2011.  Id. at 43.  Whenever the transi-
tional period is deemed to end, all EU member states must move to the information reporting system.  
See id. at 43 (mandating that the residual EU member states of Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg 
will have to apply the information reporting system at the end of the transitional period).  Technically, 
 
330 60 UCLA L. REV. 304 (2012) 
 
adopted the information exchange regime.  The three EU member states that sup-
ported bank secrecy adopted the withholding tax system, as did many of the de-
pendent territories of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, including the 
Channel Islands.83  Switzerland agreed to cooperate with the directive as the result 
of a combination of substantial coercive pressure and important financial incentives 
(notably, Swiss companies were granted the benefits of the EU Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, thereby exempting from cross-border withholding taxes dividends paid 
by an EU subsidiary of a Swiss company to its Swiss parent).84  Four smaller non-
EU European offshore banking centers (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and 
San Marino) followed Switzerland’s lead.85  Their bilateral agreements with the 
European Union adopted the EUSD’s withholding system but explicitly permitted 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the smaller European offshore banking centers 
to maintain a withholding tax indefinitely in place of information exchange.86  
The indefinite transitional period for EU member bank secrecy jurisdictions, 
and the European Union’s agreement to permanent anonymous withholding by 
Switzerland and other European offshore banking centers, created an uneasy truce 
between information reporting and anonymous withholding models for tax ad-
ministrative assistance regarding interest income within Europe. 
At one point in the current evolutionary period in cross-border administra-
tive assistance, this truce appeared to be ending.  In February 2011 the European 
Union adopted a roadmap to automatic information exchange among EU member 
  
under the EUSD, the transition period ends whenever (1) there is an agreement between the 
European Community and the last of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland 
to exchange information upon request on interest payments consistent with international standards 
(as they were then embodied in the so-called OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information 
on Tax Matters), (2) the United States commits to information exchange upon request at the same 
international standards, and (3) the European Council unanimously agrees that conditions (1) and 
(2) have been met.  Id.  Practically speaking (although perhaps not technically), conditions (1) and (2) 
have already been met.  The real barrier is the European Council’s inability to unanimously agree that 
the transition period is over. 
83. Id. at 43, 45.  In contrast to the arrangements with five non-EU sovereigns, discussed infra note 91 
and accompanying text, the dependent or associated territories of the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands (including the Channel Islands and various Caribbean islands) that did not agree to 
exchange information automatically are required to participate in the EUSD as withholding juris-
dictions and to move to automatic information exchange once the transitional period ends.  Id. 
84. See Switzerland: Year in Review, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 29, 2005, available at LEXIS, 
2005 WTD 249-5. 
85. See, e.g., Agreement Between the European Community and the Principality of Monaco Providing 
for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 
19) 55.  
86. See, e.g., Agreement Between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation Providing for 
Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 30; 
see also EUSD, supra note 80, at 45. 
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states for categories of income other than interest.87  Unlike the EUSD, the Directive 
on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation does not mandate a given 
EU member state to participate in broader automatic information exchange within 
the European Union, let alone provide incentives to encourage any country 
outside the European Union to participate.  It does provide, however, that the 
European Commission must submit proposals to the European Council before 
July 1, 2017, regarding the categories of capital and income that member states 
should be mandated to report to one another, with one aim being to extend that 
list to include capital gains, dividends, and royalties.88  If the European Council 
were to require mandatory information reporting on these categories of income, in 
addition to interest reported through the Savings Directive, EU information re-
porting would generally overlap with the income reporting, but not the asset 
reporting, required under FATCA. 
2. The OECD 
In 2006 the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD (CFA), which brings 
together the senior international tax official of each OECD member state, agreed 
to work with many of the major global cross-border financial institutions on a pro-
ject to improve the process by which portfolio investors may claim reduced source-
country withholding tax rates under tax treaties.89  Conceptually, the substan-
  
87. February Directive, supra note 41.  The February Directive generally requires that, beginning January 
1, 2014, each member state’s competent authority automatically reports to other member states 
whatever information the communicating member state has available regarding income from em-
ployment, director’s fees, pension income, life insurance products not covered by other EU legal 
instruments on information exchange and other such measures, as well as income from immovable 
property.  Id. at 6.  Under the February Directive, member states that do not wish to receive informa-
tion can opt out (for now) of both reporting and receiving information.  Id.  The February Directive 
also provides that limitations on the application of European Union Directive 95/46/EC (“Data 
Protection Directive,” related to European data protection laws) are necessary and proportionate in the 
case of tax information exchange and cooperation in light of the potential revenue loss for member 
states and the crucial importance of the February Directive in an effective fight against fraud.  Id. at 
11–12.  Thus, an EU data subject’s right to information about the use of his or her personal data, 
access to that data, and judicial remedy for breach of his or her rights under the Data Protection 
Directive is restricted for purposes of obtaining information exchange among the member states.  Id.  
The potential conflict between EU data protection law and the crucial needs of non-EU tax au-
thorities in a globalized economy is beyond the scope of this Article. 
88. Id. at 6. 
89. The OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) is the world’s leading multilateral body in interna-
tional tax policy. 
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tive objective was to recommend for countries to develop systems akin to the QI 
system.90 
The 2008 tax evasion scandals and the consequent shift in the focus of OECD 
tax administrations from source-country taxation to residence-country taxation of 
offshore assets rocked the foundations of the OECD’s project.  The resulting 
report of the Informal Consultative Group (the ICG Report) addressed one of 
QI’s major perceived shortcomings: that it intentionally leaves customer-specific 
information about the beneficial owner of any given payment at the level of the 
financial institution closest to the customer such that source countries never receive 
that information and therefore can never provide it to residence countries. 
The ICG Report recommended that OECD countries develop systems 
similar to QI.91  Taking the example provided in Part II.A as a starting point, under 
the system proposed in the report (the ICG system), Singapore Bank A would 
inform Singapore Bank B as to what tax rate should apply to the earnings on the 
Indian national’s investment in the United States (without revealing that investor’s 
identity).  Unlike under the QI system, however, Singapore Bank B would also 
route information directly to the IRS regarding the Indian national’s identity and 
return on investment (as long as the investment was of a type that benefitted from a 
reduced rate of withholding under the system).  The IRS could then, in principle, 
route this information to India.  The additional reporting therefore represents a 
pro-residence-country compliance modification of the QI system and abandons 
the anonymous withholding component of QI.92  Financial institutions from Asia, 
Europe, and North America strongly endorsed the ICG Report, making clear their 
willingness and ability to serve as cross-border tax intermediaries. 
The ICG system was developed based on the principle of consensus between 
governments and financial institutions and relied exclusively on positive incentives 
rather than penalties for financial institution participation.  The ICG system could 
ask only so much of financial institutions in exchange for these incentives.  The 
ICG system’s consequent focus on reporting in exchange for benefits for investors 
limited the potential benefit of reporting to residence countries to information on 
the kinds of payments, like dividends, that benefit from a reduced rate of tax 
withholding.  Many kinds of cross-border investment income, such as capital gains 
  
90. The CFA’s project also included a component intended to facilitate claiming tax treaty benefits for 
income earned by collective investment vehicles.  That component of the project was brought to a 
successful conclusion in 2009. 
91. OECD, ICG REPORT, supra note 66, at 2–3.  Like QI, these systems would allow authorized 
financial institutions to contract with governments to make tax treaty withholding relief claims on 
behalf of their customers on a pooled basis. 
92. See id. 
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and certain interest income, generally are not subject to source-country taxation and 
therefore withholding.  This means they are not implicated by or reported in a QI-
like system.  While recognizing the limitations of the ICG system as a means to 
address residence country concerns, senior international tax officials of the OECD 
governments decided to further develop the ICG system through an initiative 
known as the Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE) project.   
Alongside the TRACE project, the OECD continues its ongoing work to 
create information technology standards for automatic information exchange be-
tween governments to support residence-based taxation.  This OECD effort 
includes well-developed standards for capturing, exchanging, and processing in-
formation in an automatic matching system.  As a result of the OECD’s technical 
standards, a variety of jurisdictions have made advances in recent years toward au-
tomatic information exchange between governments on an electronic basis that can 
be matched against resident taxpayer records. 
The OECD was also instrumental in facilitating the 2010 revision of the 
Multilateral Convention.  The Multilateral Convention’s stated objective is to 
enable each party to the convention to counter international tax evasion and better 
enforce its national tax laws, while simultaneously respecting the rights of taxpay-
ers.93  In 1988 the convention was opened for signature by the fifty-four countries 
that are members of the Council of Europe, the OECD, or both.  The 1988 
convention proved to be of limited applicability and no practical import.94  In 
2010, however, based on a request of the 2009 G20 summit,95 the Multilateral 
Convention was amended to incorporate OECD Model Tax Convention stand-
ards for tax information exchange, and membership was opened up to all countries, 
with particular emphasis placed on including developing economies so that they 
might benefit from a “new cooperative international tax environment.”96  The 
convention now provides a general legal framework under which automatic 
  
93. OECD & COUNCIL OF EUR., THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS: AMENDED BY THE 2010 PROTOCOL 
(2011) [hereinafter OECD & COUNCIL OF EUR., MULTILATERAL CONVENTION], available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115606-en. 
94. Id. (acknowledging that the Multilateral Convention appeared to be a novel step forward in 
multilateral tax cooperation when agreed in the 1980s but was thereafter disregarded and left almost 
entirely unused even by its signatories). 
95. The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters-Background, OECD.ORG (June 4, 
2010), http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3746,en_2649_33767_44886082_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, as then-chair of the G20, indicated in a letter to the OECD 
that “it would be helpful, in this regard, if an effective multilateral mechanism could be developed.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
96. APRIL 2009 LONDON COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 11, at 5. 
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cross-border tax information exchange could, in principle, be established among a 
broad range of sovereign participants. 
3. FATCA 
In 2010, following the UBS scandal and President Obama’s campaign com-
mitment to crack down on offshore tax evasion,97 the U.S. Congress enacted sec-
tions 1471 to 1474 (generally known as FATCA98) of the Internal Revenue Code.  
Under FATCA, foreign financial institutions are generally required to report 
information on financial accounts of U.S. persons and foreign entities with signifi-
cant U.S. ownership (U.S. accounts) directly to the IRS beginning in 2014.99  
Foreign financial institutions must report the account balance or value of each U.S. 
account100 and the amount of dividends, interest, other income, and gross proceeds 
from the sale of property credited to a U.S. account.101  The rules are intended to 
provide reporting both on accounts held directly by individuals and on interests in 
accounts held by shell entities for the benefit of U.S. persons.102 
Congress explained that in enacting FATCA, it intended to “force foreign fi-
nancial institutions to disclose their U.S. account holders or pay a steep penalty for 
nondisclosure.”103  Accordingly, FATCA imposes a withholding tax104 on the 
  
97. Id. 
98. Sections 1471 to 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code were enacted in the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance title (Title V) of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010 
(HIRE Act), Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–535, 124 Stat. 71, 97–115.  An earlier version of 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance title of the HIRE Act was introduced in Congress as the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.  The acronym FATCA stuck with these provisions. 
99. The statutory effective date is January 1, 2013, but as of the fall of 2012 regulatory guidance had 
effectively delayed implementation of FATCA by one year.  Chapter 4 Implementation Notice 
2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124, 2011 WL 2741154.  U.S. accounts are technically defined as 
financial accounts that are held by specified U.S. persons or U.S.-owned foreign entities.  I.R.C. 
§ 1471(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2011).  Financial accounts are broadly defined to pull in interests in hedge 
funds, private equity funds, and other investment arrangements.   
100. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1)(C). 
101. See Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions and 
Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities, 77 
Fed. Reg. 9022 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301). 
102. For this purpose a “U.S. person” generally includes any citizen or resident of the United States.  The 
term “specified U.S. person” excludes various types of entities from the scope of the provision.  I.R.C. 
§ 1473(3). 
103. HIRE Act, 156 Cong. Rec. S1745, S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
104. In a conventional withholding tax, withholding on a given payment is associated with a given 
taxpayer’s U.S. income tax liability or potential U.S. income tax liability in connection with the 
payment with respect to which withholding is imposed.  FATCA is not a conventional withholding 
tax.  Although nominally labeled a “tax,” it is better understood as a penalty regime intended to force 
foreign financial institutions to disclose information to the IRS. 
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gross amount of certain payments from U.S. sources and the proceeds from dis-
posing of certain U.S. investments (withholdable payments) on foreign financial 
institutions that do not comply and become a “participating foreign financial insti-
tution.”105  This withholding tax also applies to certain other payments to the extent 
that the funding for those payments may be attributed to withholdable payments 
(“passthru payments”).106  Importantly, this withholding tax is not limited to pay-
ments to U.S. persons.  In other words, if foreign financial institutions will not 
agree to report to the United States on income earned by U.S. persons through ac-
counts at those institutions, FATCA requires withholding on a wide range of 
payments from the United States to those same financial institutions, regardless 
of whether the payments are beneficially owned by U.S. persons on which the IRS 
wants reporting, by non-U.S. customers of the institution, or by the institution 
itself.107  Section 1471 also requires participating foreign financial institutions to 
withhold on payments to nonparticipating foreign financial institutions.  It thus 
was intended (1) to induce foreign financial institutions that are investing in or 
through participating financial institutions, but that are not investing in the United 
States, to also agree to participate in FATCA,108 and (2) to disincline participating 
  
105. More technically, withholdable payments generally include any payment of fixed or determinable 
annual or periodical income, if such payments are from sources within the United States, and gross 
proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any property of a type that can produce interest or 
dividends from sources within the United States.  I.R.C. § 1473(1)(A). 
106. The term “passthru payment” means any withholdable payment or other payment to the extent 
attributable to a withholdable payment.  I.R.C. § 1471(d)(7).  As part of the foreign financial 
institution (FFI) Agreement, Section 1471 requires participating FFIs to deduct and withhold a tax 
equal to 30 percent of any passthru payment that is made by the participating FFI to a recalcitrant 
account holder or a nonparticipating FFI.  I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i).  The U.S. Treasury has 
effectively turned off passthru payment withholding by means of delaying passthru payment 
withholding, other than withholding on withholdable payments, by regulation and by effectively 
removing the concept of passthru payment withholding from its model intergovernmental agree-
ment.  See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 2–3, 2011-1 C.B. 765, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-drop/n-11-34.pdf; MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 4, arts. 4(1)(e), 
6(2).  The statute defines recalcitrant account holders as those account holders that fail to comply 
with reasonable requests for information by a participating FFI in order for it to meet its reporting 
obligations under an FFI Agreement or that fail to provide a waiver in any case in which any foreign 
law would (but for such waiver) prevent the reporting of any information an FFI is required to report 
under its FFI Agreement.  I.R.C. § 1471(d)(6). 
107. I.R.C. § 1471. 
108. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  When an FFI is not acting as a custodian or nominee and 
is not a tax-transparent entity receiving payments on behalf of its members, payments that the FFI 
makes to account holders (including investors in its equity or debt instruments) would be treated 
under generally applicable U.S. tax principles as non-U.S.-source income of those account holders 
and therefore would not be “withholdable payments.”  Thus, in the absence of a passthru payment 
concept, the many FFIs that do not do business directly in U.S. securities, and their account holders, 
would generally fall outside the scope of FATCA. 
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foreign financial institutions from doing business with nonparticipating financial 
institutions because business between participating and nonparticipating finan-
cial institutions may require withholding under U.S. law.  Through the passthru 
payment mechanism, FATCA as legislated tried to use the combined weight of 
U.S. financial markets and financial institutions that must, as a practical matter, 
do business in the U.S. marketplace as leverage with other foreign financial insti-
tutions to ensure near-comprehensive participation in FATCA’s cross-border in-
formation reporting.109  It is clear, however, that the United States could neither 
implement broadly applicable passthru payment withholding nor achieve 
near-comprehensive financial institution participation through unilateral measures 
alone. 
A related difficulty is that as legislated, FATCA’s reporting is also unilateral; 
it benefits the United States alone, while putting significant burdens on foreign 
financial institutions.  Furthermore, FATCA as legislated routes information re-
porting directly to the U.S. government and could be understood to require clo-
sure of certain account holders’ accounts, withholding on payments made by a 
foreign financial institution to account holders and other foreign financial institu-
tions, or both.  As a result, compliance with FATCA may require foreign finan-
cial institutions in many jurisdictions to violate contractual relationships as well as 
data protection, bank secrecy, or other laws of the jurisdiction in which they are 
located.110  Beginning with her first major public address on these issues on 
December 16, 2011, Emily McMahon, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy at the U.S. Department of Treasury, acknowledged the difficulties associ-
ated with FATCA’s unilateral approach.  She stated that the United States could 
not ask foreign financial institutions to report to the United States routinely if the 
United States did not routinely collect certain information on nonresidents from 
domestic financial institutions that it could provide to cooperating foreign sover-
eigns.111  She went on to suggest that the United States was committed to enter-
  
109. The coercive force of FATCA’s withholding mechanism is also important as a vehicle to bring in 
nontraditional financial institutions such as private equity funds, hedge funds, and insurance 
companies. 
110. See, e.g., Letter From Faye M. Polayes, Tax Counsel, HSBC N. Am., to Manal Corwin, Int’l Tax 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Michael Danilack, Deputy Comm’r (Int’l), IRS, and Steve 
Musher, Assoc. Chief Counsel, IRS (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/ 
Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_HSBC_060711_WithCopyright_ 
062311.pdf; see also infra notes 114–115 and accompanying text. 
111. Emily McMahon, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Treasury, Keynote Address at the George 
Washington University Law School & I.R.S. Conference: Current Issues in International Taxation 
(Dec. 16, 2011) (notes on file with author) (speaking at a conference widely viewed as one of the 
premier annual gatherings of U.S. international tax practitioners and government tax officials, with 
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ing into bilateral and multilateral agreements that would allow financial institu-
tions to comply with FATCA without violating local law.112  Finally, McMahon 
described FATCA as a vehicle to achieve a transition to a multilateral system.113 
Then in February 2012 the Treasury Department issued a joint statement 
(Joint Statement I) with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
providing for an intergovernmental approach to FATCA implementation.114  The 
joint statement acknowledged that FATCA “has raised a number of issues,” in-
cluding that financial institutions in the European joint statement countries “may 
not be able to comply with the reporting, withholding and account closure re-
quirements because of legal restrictions.”115  The framework adopted in Joint 
Statement I is accordingly based on reporting by financial institutions to the tax 
authority of the country in which they are located, followed by reciprocal automat-
ic information exchange between governments.116  Thus, non-U.S. financial in-
stitutions would report information on U.S. persons to the country in which the 
institution resides and then have the information transferred to the United States 
by the foreign sovereign, and vice versa.  That routing mechanism, in contrast to 
FATCA’s statutory direct, one-way reporting to the IRS, would resolve the con-
flict of law issues largely by bringing the United States into line with the routing 
mechanism of the EUSD. 
Joint Statement I also suggested that the six governments would develop a 
shared approach to incentives, reporting, and customer identification.  For exam-
ple, with respect to incentives (and mandates), the joint statement provides that the 
framework for an intergovernmental approach would also include a practical and 
effective alternative approach to achieving the policy objective of passthru payment 
withholding.117  As described above, that policy purpose is to ensure (by means of 
coercion) near-comprehensive participation by financial institutions in an auto-
matic information reporting system.  Joint Statement I thus suggested that a shared 
  
over 700 international tax lawyers in attendance).  In 2011 the Obama administration proposed 
regulations that would require U.S. financial institutions to collect and report to the IRS bank deposit 
interest information for all nonresident alien individuals, whatever their country of residence. 
112. Alison Bennett, U.S. Open to Intergovernmental Approach To FATCA Information Sharing, Official Says, 
DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 19, 2011, at G-11. 
113. See McMahon, supra note 111; see also John Herzfeld, Financial Institutions: FATCA Rules in Final 
Review Stages; McMahon Notes Billions in Offshore Yields, DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 25, 2012, at G-4 
(reporting McMahon making the same point and observing that FATCA “cannot be the end of the 
story”). 
114. Joint Statement I, supra note 4. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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approach to incentives (which could also be described as “defensive measures”) was 
under consideration to ensure that other countries and institutions join an auto-
matic information exchange system.  The joint statement similarly provided for the 
development of common “reporting and due diligence standards.”118  Joint 
Statement I and the Treasury’s public statements represented a substantial multi-
lateral turn for FATCA implementation, given that the statute itself adopts a dis-
tinctly unilateral approach. 
Then, in June 2012 the United States and Switzerland issued a joint state-
ment (Joint Statement II)119 that generally provided for Swiss financial institutions 
to report on consenting U.S. account holders directly to the IRS and report on 
nonconsenting U.S. account holders on an aggregate basis consistent with FATCA 
rules.  Switzerland then agreed to provide information exchange upon request with 
respect to such ascertainable groups.  Unlike the anonymous withholding agree-
ments with countries like Germany and the United Kingdom, the Swiss–U.S. 
agreement will not provide the United States with information on the jurisdictions 
to which U.S. account holders most commonly choose to move those untaxed as-
sets in advance of the FATCA effective date.  Joint Statement II represents a vic-
tory for the United States standing alone in that Switzerland accepted a modified 
form of FATCA compliance.  On the other hand, Joint Statement II may repre-
sent an effective Swiss rearguard action against multilateral automatic information 
exchange in that it (1) continues to reject automatic information exchange in prin-
ciple, (2) largely defuses the coercive force of FATCA withholding as a source of 
pressure that might help obtain automatic information exchange from Switzerland 
for other jurisdictions, and (3) allows Switzerland to continue promoting an anon-
ymous withholding alternative to other countries that are able to pressure it for en-
hanced cooperation. 
The EU, OECD, and the original, purely legislative U.S. approaches to cross-
border tax information exchange are challenging to reconcile because they incon-
sistently address identification, reporting, scope, verification, routing, and incentive 
  
118. Id. 
119. Joint Statement II, supra note 6.  On the same date, the United States issued a similar joint statement 
with Japan.  Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Joint Statement From the United States and Japan 
Regarding a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of 
FATCA and Improve International Tax Compliance (June 21, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Documents/FATCA Joint Statement US-Japan.pdf.  Like Joint 
Statement II, the joint statement with Japan creates a mechanism for Japanese financial institutions 
to provide information about U.S. account holders to the IRS in order to comply with FATCA 
without necessarily committing the Japanese government to developing more extensive mechanisms 
for cooperation with the IRS that might facilitate broader automatic information exchange.  Id. 
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issues, while also presenting different models of inter-nation cooperation.  Part IV 
returns to these inconsistencies and makes some observations on how they can be 
reconciled.  The key point at this juncture is that the shared commitment to infor-
mation exchange sets TRACE, the EUSD, and FATCA apart from the anony-
mous withholding alternative that the Swiss government has aggressively 
promoted. 
C. Anonymous Withholding: The Swiss Approach 
Switzerland’s substitute for the tax information reporting models provided 
by the European Union, the OECD, and the United States has gained significant 
traction.  Swiss financial institutions largely developed the approach and the Swiss 
government subsequently adopted it.120  It provides for anonymous withholding 
and regularization of untaxed assets for residents of key Swiss trading partners, it is 
intended to substitute for cross-border automatic tax information exchange with 
respect to non-Swiss residents holding Swiss accounts, and it is justified as a means 
to protect the financial privacy of account holders.121  Its fundamental objective is to 
ensure that automatic tax information exchange does not take hold as a global 
system. 
 
  
120. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.  In February 2011 the CEO of the Swiss Bankers 
Association (SBA) reported with satisfaction that the Swiss government had adopted the SBA’s 
strategy and was implementing that strategy efficiently.  Claude-Alain Margelisch, Foreword to 
SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND: STATUS REPORT AND 
TRENDS 2, 2 (2011), available at http://www.swissbanking.ch/en/20110107-bro-vermoegens 
verwaltungsgeschaeft-rva.pdf. 
121. This Article does not focus on arguments around client privacy.  Those who claim, however, that 
financial institutions should not report information to the government of a country in which a client 
resides for financial privacy reasons must argue either (1) that bank secrecy vis-à-vis tax admin-
istrations is part and parcel of a basic right to privacy and that the information reporting/information 
availability model for tax enforcement in almost every major developed economy is thus unjust, (2) 
that individuals who have the wherewithal and sophistication to bank internationally should have 
access to elective bank secrecy, or (3) that bank secrecy needs to be preserved vis-à-vis authoritarian 
and corrupt regimes.  The first of these arguments rejects longstanding legal and policy notions in 
every major developed economy that tax administration access to resident taxpayer financial infor-
mation is consistent with a taxpayer’s reasonable expectations of privacy.  The second argument is 
entirely untenable; there is no credible basis for arguing that having sufficient wealth or sophisti-
cation to access offshore banking should give an individual the right to bank secrecy.  The third 
argument conflates the idea that the benefits of a multilateral information exchange system should not 
be extended to all governments with the proposition that any individual, regardless of whether he or 
she resides in a just or unjust, democratic or undemocratic, or morally legitimate or illegitimate state, 
should have the option to elect individually to evade his or her taxes securely. 
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Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom (each a partner country) recently 
signed treaties with Switzerland based on this approach and thus will each become 
a Swiss partner country if those treaties come into force.122  Further, Greece and 
Italy are reported to be negotiating such agreements with Switzerland.123  At one 
point the French parliament also asked the French finance ministry to study such 
an agreement.124  Such agreements are important because Switzerland is the world’s 
most important offshore asset management center (managing approximately 27 
percent of the world’s offshore wealth)125 and is also the headquarters for certain 
systemically important global financial institutions (for example, UBS and Credit 
Suisse).  Switzerland also has the power to lead other offshore asset management 
jurisdictions by its example, and it has done so in the past.126  The agreements 
therefore have dealt a significant blow to the emergence of automatic cross-border 
information reporting and will deliver a further blow if they are ratified.127  The 
agreements provide that investment income and capital gains of partner country 
residents with Swiss deposits or accounts will be taxed by Switzerland at agreed-
upon rates that vary by country and category of income, with the proceeds remitted 
  
122. See generally Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5; U.K.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15. 
123. Greece Seeks Withholding Tax Agreement With Swiss, STEP J. (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.stepjournal. 
org/news/news/secondary_news/greece_seeks_withholding_tax_a.aspx; see also Christiane Schlötzer, 
Die Spur der Scheine [The Track of the Bills], SÜDDEUTSCHE.DE (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www. 
sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/steuerabkommen-zwischen-schweiz-und-griechenland-die-spur-der-
scheine-1.1344218 (Ger.); Giuseppe Fonte, Italy Senate Urges Swiss–Italy Tax Deal, REUTERS 
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/italy-tax-idUSL5E7KG2VH 
20110916.  Italy’s Prime Minister declared the possibility of negotiating a similar agreement with 
Switzerland if certain conditions are met.  Armando Mombelli, Segnali di disgelo nella vertenza fiscal 
[Signs of Thaw in Tax Dispute], SWISSINFO.CH (May 3, 2012), http://www.swissinfo.ch/ita/ 
politica/Segnali_di_disgelo_nella_vertenza_fiscale_.html?cid=32616442 (It.). 
124. As of late November 2011, French Budget Minister, Valérie Pécresse, opposed a similar agreement 
with Switzerland.  France Has a “Choice” on Tax Says Calmy-Rey, SWISSINFO.CH (Nov. 25, 2011, 9:11 
AM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/France_has_a_choice_on_tax_says_Calmy-Rey.html 
?cid=31636338. 
125. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 1, at 13. 
126. See, e.g., notes 82–84, infra, and accompanying text. 
127. But see Matthew Allen, Rubik Tax Treaties Face Serious Hurdle, SWISSINFO.CH (Nov. 25, 2011, 1:33 
PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/Spotlight_on_ 
banking_secrecy/Rubik_tax_treaties_face_serious_hurdle.html?cid=31638262 (noting that France 
has “closed the door” on an anonymous withholding agreement and describing the EU Commission’s 
legal objection to anonymous withholding); Steuerabkommen mit der Schweiz?—Italien winkt (noch) 
ab [Tax Treaty With Switzerland?—Italy (Still) Demurs], SCHWEIZER FERNSEHEN [SWISS TV] 
(Dec. 8, 2011, 12:58 AM), http://www.tagesschau.sf.tv/Nachrichten/Archiv/2011/12/08/Schweiz/ 
Steuerabkommen-mit-der-Schweiz-Italien-winkt-noch-ab (Ger.) (noting that Prime Minister 
Monti previously suggested that the Italian government did not intend to enter into a tax agreement 
with Switzerland on the model of Bern’s agreements with Germany and the United Kingdom). 
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anonymously to the partner country.128  The agreements specify that once Swiss 
financial institutions impose the withholding tax, the investor’s tax obligation to 
the partner country will be fulfilled.129  Partner country residents with Swiss bank 
accounts will not have any tax liability or information reporting obligation to the 
partner country on income or capital gains with respect to which the anonymous 
withholding tax is imposed.130 
Partner country residents that held Swiss accounts in the past and choose to 
keep those accounts after May of the year the agreement enters into force will gen-
erally be charged a one-time lump sum by the Swiss institutions that hold their ac-
counts and be subject to anonymous withholding on future dividends, interest, and 
capital gains.131  The one-time charge on existing assets of account holders resi-
dent in the partner country varies from between 15 percent to 41 percent of the 
assets in question.132  This one-time charge is intended as a rough proxy to com-
pensate for past tax evasion.  A one-time charge to address the past should be sepa-
  
128. The German and Austrian agreements specify that the Swiss will impose the same tax rate applicable 
to investment income and capital gains earned by German and Austrian residents through any 
institution that does not impose anonymous withholding, while the U.K. agreement provides for 
rates slightly below the regular U.K. rates on the relevant categories of income.  
Thus, the Swiss–U.K. agreement generally provides that future investment income and capital 
gains of U.K. residents with Swiss deposits or accounts will be taxed by Switzerland at a rate of 
40 percent on dividend income, 48 percent on interest income and other investment income, and 27 
percent on capital gains.  See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 19(1); U.K.–
Switz. Protocol Amendment, supra note 5, art. 8.  The German–Swiss agreement specifies a tax rate 
of 26.375 percent for investment income and capital gains, in line with the 25 percent German tax 
rate, plus the “solidarity surcharge.”  Press Release, Swiss Fed. Dep’t of Fin., Switzerland and 
Germany Initial Tax Agreement (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/ 
medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=40533 [hereinafter Switzerland and 
Germany Initial Tax Agreement].  The Austrian–Swiss agreement foresees a 25 percent tax rate.  
Press Release, Swiss Fed. Dep’t of Fin., Switzerland and Austria Sign Withholding Tax Agreement 
(Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=44130. 
129. See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 9(7), (12)–(13), 19(5); Ger.–Switz. 
Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 7(6), 18(4); Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, 
supra note 5, arts. 7(6), 17(3). 
130. See supra note 129. 
131. U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, 
supra note 15, art. 7; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7. 
132. The one-time tax rate on assets varies based on a formula that takes into account the duration of the 
client’s relationship with the withholding financial institution as well as the initial and final amount of 
the capital in the account over the period assessed under the agreements.  Switzerland and Germany 
Initial Tax Agreement, supra note 128; U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9; 
Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7; U.K.–Switz. Protocol Letters, supra note 
15; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7. 
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rated conceptually from the issues associated with an anonymous withholding 
system for taxing future dividends, interest, and capital gains.133 
Under the agreements, if partner country residents move their Swiss accounts 
out of Switzerland prior to May 31 of the year the agreement enters into force, po-
tentially opening replacement accounts in other offshore financial centers (includ-
ing non-Swiss branches of Swiss banks), they avoid the lump-sum payment, future 
withholding, and disclosure of their accounts.134  Thus, under the agreements, 
partner country residents can evade both taxation and disclosure if they wish.  Swiss 
banks have agreed to guarantee Germany at least EUR 2 billion in revenue and to 
guarantee the United Kingdom at least CHF 500 million, regardless of how much 
withholding is actually assessed under the one-off assessments imposed by the 
agreements.135 
Switzerland will report to the partner country the ten jurisdictions to which 
partner country residents who close their accounts transfer the largest volume of 
assets.136  Switzerland will also tell the partner country how many of its residents 
moved funds out of Switzerland to those various ten jurisdictions but will not 
identify those people.137  These arrangements simultaneously maintain client an-
onymity and encourage the partner country to pressure the jurisdictions where 
partner country residents move their money to provide anonymous withholding, 
thereby helping to further spread the Swiss approach. 
The Swiss agreements assert that this bilateral system achieves “a level of co-
operation which has, with regard to taxation in respect of income and gains on rel-
evant assets an enduring effect equivalent to the outcome that would be achieved 
through an agreement to exchange information about such individuals on an au-
  
133. One could imagine a one-time charge to resolve past tax evasion combined with an automatic infor-
mation reporting regime for the future.  The agreements themselves in effect acknowledge that 
addressing the past and providing for the future are separate issues.  U.K.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 10; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9; 
Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 9.  This Article does not take a position 
on the question of whether amnesty for the past (as opposed to compliance in the future) should 
require disclosure. 
134. See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7(1); Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 5(1); Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5(1). 
135. See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 17(2); Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 15(2).  The agreement with Austria does not include an upfront 
payment. 
136. See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 18; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 15. 
137. See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 18; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 15. 
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tomatic basis.”138  Ratification of this declaration by major financial centers would 
achieve a central aim and key political goal of Swiss policy: gaining acceptance of 
the idea that anonymous withholding is equivalent to automatic information ex-
change.139  For this reason, the Swiss press almost universally described the agree-
ments as a major coup in Switzerland’s rearguard effort to defend bank secrecy.140 
D. A New International Regime? 
It is easy to see the EU, OECD, Swiss, and U.S. approaches to cross-border 
tax administrative assistance as four competing systems.  Yet doing so obscures a 
more fundamental point.  At the start of the twenty-first century, neither govern-
ments nor financial institutions believed the institutions had a systematic role in 
quelling offshore tax evasion.  Today, all the emerging systems for cross-border 
tax cooperation assume financial institutions will function as cross-border tax 
agents, whether as withholding agents or as information reporting agents.  Despite 
the differences among these proposed systems, the fact remains that the European 
Union, the OECD, Switzerland, and the United States have all coalesced around 
this conclusion.  That consensus represents a remarkable shift in global under-
standings.  It has allowed the discourse of international tax cooperation to shift 
from a dispute about whether financial intermediaries should function as cross-
border tax intermediaries to a dispute about how financial intermediaries should 
perform that role. 
Financial institutions themselves appear to have accepted the inevitability of 
this new international regime.  Whereas only a few years ago these same institu-
tions eschewed any meaningful role in global efforts to police cross-border tax eva-
sion, they now seek to shape the role they will play.  For example, in response to 
FATCA, the U.S. Treasury has received hundreds of detailed submissions with 
comments from a variety of non-U.S. financial intermediaries, including tradition-
al banks as well as pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, bond traders, 
and trust vehicles, and also industry associations and national chambers of com-
  
138. U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1; see Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1. 
139. See, e.g., Press Release, Swiss Fed. Dep’t of Fin., Switzerland and the UK Initial Tax Agreement 
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.sif.admin.ch/00488/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=40731. 
140. See, e.g., Matthew Allen, Ist das Schweizer Bankgeheimnis gerettet?, SWISSINFO.CH (Oct. 29, 2011, 
3:16 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/Wirtschaft/Finanzsektor_im_Umbruch/Bankgeheimnis_ 
im_Rampenlicht/Ist_das_Schweizer_Bankgeheimnis_gerettet.html?cid=28660632. 
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merce.141  The submissions consistently accept, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
the time has come for financial intermediaries to be cross-border tax intermediar-
ies.142  Financial institutions are embracing a multilateral approach, if only to best 
manage their compliance costs as cross-border tax intermediaries. 
Thus, the British Bankers Association (BBA), although scathingly critical of 
FATCA in a series of comment letters to the U.S. Treasury, has noted that al-
though FATCA is intended to combat U.S. tax evasion, the problem is a global 
one that can be solved only with participation by financial institutions.  In what 
counts as a moment of shocking clarity by the standard of financial industry 
submissions to tax regulatory processes, the BBA, only months after FATCA was 
enacted, suggested that 
[i]n the longer term, we urge the U.S. and other nations to work towards 
an alternative global multilateral solution, where there would be recipro-
cal arrangements for all jurisdictions, and where information could be 
collected and exchanged between governments.  We propose that con-
sideration of a multilateral solution be an agenda item for upcoming 
meetings of the G20 since this is clearly an issue of international concern 
that requires a coordinated response.143 
This proposal came from the leading association for banking and financial services 
in the United Kingdom, which represents banking organizations headquartered 
not only in the United Kingdom but also around the world.  A series of other 
industry groups and national banking associations expressed similar sentiments 
  
141. See, e.g., Letter From Mary Richardson, Dir. of Regulatory & Tax Dep’t, Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, 
to Steven Musher, Assoc. Chief Counsel, Int’l, IRS, and Manal Corwin, Int’l Tax Counsel, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury: Foreign Account Tax Compliance (‘FATCA’) (June 29, 2010) 
[hereinafter AIMA Letter], available at http://www.bsmlegal.com/PDFs/AIMAsubmissionto
USTreasuryandIRSreFATCA29June.pdf; see also infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text. 
142. Some might describe industry endorsement of a global system as financial institutions trying to 
prolong the time before they will need to comply with any regime and simultaneously making lem-
onade out of lemons by ensuring they face only one regime.  Such purported motives (which may or 
may not accurately reflect any given institution’s motives) do not change the basic decision to endorse 
a multilateral regime.  See, e.g., AIMA Letter, supra note 141; see also infra notes 143–144 and 
accompanying text. 
143. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, NOTICE 2010-60, NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 
REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION REPORTING AND WITHHOLDING 
UNDER CHAPTER 4 OF THE CODE (Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://www.bsmlegal.com/ 
PDFs/FATCA_BBA_20101029.pdf; see also BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, NOTICE 2011-34, 
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE TO NOTICE 2010-60 PROVIDING FURTHER GUIDANCE AND 
REQUESTING COMMENTS ON CERTAIN PRIORITY ISSUES UNDER CHAPTER 4 OF SUBTITLE A 
OF THE CODE (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/ 
Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_British_Bankers_Ass_06072011_061611.pdf. 
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about the importance of developing a coordinated multilateral approach for fi-
nancial institutions to serve as cross-border tax intermediaries.144 
Commentary from the financial sector regarding the OECD’s TRACE 
project highlights the same convergence around the idea of financial institutions as 
cross-border tax intermediaries.  Consider the submission of the Capital Markets 
Tax Committee of Asia (CMTCA) to the OECD’s work.  The CMTCA is a 
financial services industry body comprising major commercial banks, investment 
banks, securities firms, and other diversified financial services institutions operating 
in Asia.  In its submission to the OECD, the CMTCA suggests that “cross-border 
information gathering and information exchange represents the new reality of the 
global economy.”145  It does not object to rules requiring its members to make 
customer and account information available to tax administrators on a routine basis 
for the purpose of cross-border information exchange.146  Indeed, the CMTCA 
writes that “because of their unique position in the global economy, it is inevitable 
that financial institutions will be increasingly called upon to make such infor-
mation available to tax administrators.”147  The CMTCA’s submission is re-
markable because it demonstrates that a leading tax-related association of major 
financial institutions operating in Hong Kong and Singapore—the two most im-
portant financial centers popularly understood to be resistant to cross-border tax 
  
144. See, e.g., Letter From Int’l Council of Sec. Ass’ns to Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, and Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, IRS: Implication of the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) (June 28, 2011), available at http://www.icsa.bz/img/letter_pdf/ICSA-
FATCA-Letter-Jun-2011.pdf (“Rather than the unilateral approach taken by FATCA, we suggest 
that a more appropriate approach would be the development of a global framework that would allow 
the US and other governments to obtain information regarding income paid to citizens of their 
countries by foreign financial institutions which is in harmony with each jurisdiction’s existing laws 
and does not create an excessive compliance burden for financial institutions.”); Letter From the 
Dutch Banking Ass’n to Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Treasury, et al.: Comments 
of the Dutch Banking Association on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, as Well as Notice 
2010-60 and Notice 2011-34, at 1 (June 9, 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/ 
Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_NBV_060911_090811.pdf (“The 
Dutch Banking Association . . . would suggest a coordinated approach of states similar to what has 
been done in the area of transfer pricing, where through development of common concepts compli-
ance efforts have been limited to a manageable position for taxpayers.”); Letter From Eur. Banking 
Fed’n & Inst. of Int’l Bankers to Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Int’l Tax Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, et al.: Comments on Notice 2010-60 Providing Preliminary Guidance on 
FATCA (Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local 
%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_EBF_IIB_FATCA_Comment_Letter_Nov12_121010.pdf 
(making similar comments). 
145. Letter From Capital Mkts. Tax Comm. of Asia to Jeffrey Owens, Dir., CTPA, OECD (Aug. 18, 
2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/60/46019879.pdf. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
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intermediation by financial institutions—has at least resigned itself to this new 
regime. 
Finally, and as described earlier, Swiss financial institutions not only have 
consented to the anonymous withholding approach—they are in fact its origina-
tors.  As the Swiss Banking Association pointed out in its 2009–2010 Annual 
Report, “The flat rate tax project represents an important element of both the Swiss 
Bankers Association’s 2015 Financial Centre Strategy and the financial market 
strategy of the Swiss federal government, published in December 2009.  The flat 
rate tax project proposal was developed in a body constituted by the Swiss banks.”148 
Together the United States, the European Union and its member states’ de-
pendencies, and the other OECD economies (including Switzerland) represent 59 
percent of global gross domestic product (GDP)149 and the management location 
for more than 80 percent of global financial assets.150  The comments on the EU, 
OECD, and U.S. systems that endorse some form of automatic multilateral tax 
information exchange come from associations that represent much of the global fi-
nancial industry. 
The views of both private and public sector actors are thus converging around 
new principles and norms wherein financial institutions act as cross-border tax 
agents for governments.  We are witnessing the birth of a new international regime 
for cross-border tax administrative assistance with respect to income and assets held 
through offshore accounts.  The most basic contour of the emerging regime—
financial institutions as cross-border tax intermediaries—is already established.  
Two other key elements remain to be determined: the nature of the cooperation 
required by the regime (anonymous withholding or information reporting), and 
the scope of beneficiaries of the regime (major financial centers and states politically 
bound to those financial centers, or the greater part of the world).  Anonymous 
withholding available to a limited number of states is the more likely default result, 
but a broadly multilateral automatic information exchange system is the normative-
ly preferable answer. 
  
148. SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, TÄTIGKEITSBERICHT 2009/2010 [2009–2010 ANNUAL REPORT] 
(2010), http://www.swissbanking.org/en/taetigkeitsbericht-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2009–2010 
ANNUAL REPORT]. 
149. U.S. Dep’t of State, What Is the OECD?, USMISSION.GOV, http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/ 
overview.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
150. Eighty-two percent of global financial assets (managed both domestically and offshore) are managed 
from France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or the United States.  The re-
maining 18 percent of assets consists in significant measure of assets of a resident of one of the other 
OECD economies managed from within that OECD economy.  SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, 
WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND 7 (2009), available at http://www.finanzplatz-
zuerich.ch/portals/1/Documents/DE/Studien/Wealthmanagement2009_sbvg_0109[1].pdf. 
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III. ANONYMOUS WITHHOLDING VS. AUTOMATIC  
INFORMATION REPORTING 
Automatic information reporting systems and cross-border anonymous 
withholding systems both clearly break from past practice and move toward a glob-
al norm of financial institutions serving as cross-border tax agents for governments.  
Neither system represents the most comprehensive solution to address offshore ac-
counts, which would involve nonanonymous cross-border withholding in combi-
nation with automatic information reporting.151  Between the two models presently 
under consideration internationally, however, an information reporting model is 
superior to an anonymous withholding model.  Information reporting is substan-
tively superior because it is able to address concerns regarding the accretion of un-
taxed principal, whereas withholding solutions are not.  Furthermore, contrary to 
some conventional wisdom, anonymous withholding is not significantly cheaper, 
simpler, or more administrable than information reporting. 
Just as importantly, cross-border anonymous withholding institutionalizes 
differentiated treatment of the most sophisticated taxpayers from the rest of socie-
ty.  In doing so, it undermines tax morale and the role that taxation can play in 
helping to define citizenship in a democratic polity.  In contrast, information re-
porting can empower the tax system to act as a building block of liberal democra-
cy.  Where anonymous withholding has the effect of reducing policy flexibility and 
sovereign authority, information reporting preserves sovereign policy autonomy.  
Particularly outside the largest developed economies, these differences favor au-
tomatic information reporting. 
Finally, politically speaking, anonymous withholding will not be accepted 
globally, whereas automatic information reporting has the capacity to develop into 
a global regime.  Information reporting regimes could conceivably grow to serve a 
wide range of states, whereas anonymous withholding regimes will, at best, serve 
only the interests of the wealthiest states with the most influential financial cen-
ters.  Despite the superiority of information reporting, if a crucial subset of major 
financial centers accepts anonymous withholding, anonymous withholding for a 
limited number of countries may become a stable equilibrium.  This dynamic makes 
  
151. Cf. Michael Keen & Jenny E. Ligthart, Information Sharing and International Taxation 3 (Tilberg 
Univ. Discussion Paper No. 2004-117, 2004), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=12179 
(suggesting that information sharing “may now be the last hope of the residence principle,” observing 
that other policy responses to offshore tax evasion may be a step too far in terms of being perceived as 
intrusions on national sovereignty, and treating anonymous withholding and information reporting 
as substitutes for rather than complements to each other as a practical matter). 
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the outcomes of the current evolutionary moment crucial to the development of 
cross-border administrative assistance. 
A. Effectiveness and Administration 
1. Reaching Untaxed Principal 
Automatic information reporting has the capacity to address concerns regard-
ing the accretion of untaxed principal, which is a significant concern for tax ad-
ministrators.  Anonymous withholding is triggered only when interest, dividends, 
or capital gains are earned in a foreign account, whereas automatic information re-
porting can be structured both to report on income and gains and to measure the 
growth of principal in a foreign account.  While scholarly discussions of tax evasion 
often focus on tax revenues lost because of untaxed investment income,152 discus-
sions with policymakers reveal that government officials have focused equally on 
the use of offshore structures to evade taxation on domestic business income of 
closely held businesses, with the proceeds from that evasion then being invested 
through offshore accounts so as to evade tax on the resulting investment income.153  
For instance, the hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
which served as a catalyst for recent U.S. efforts to crack down on offshore tax eva-
sion, focused intently on exactly this kind of tax evasion.154  U.S. Department of 
Justice prosecutions have similarly reflected the concern that taxpayers are evad-
ing tax by fraudulently shifting domestic taxable income offshore.155  Tax admin-
  
152. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40623_ 
20090709.pdf; Joseph Guttentag & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in 
BRIDGING THE TAX GAP: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 99 
(Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005). 
153. This is a conclusion the author drew following discussions with current and former government 
officials from Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, India, and the United States. 
154. Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools and Secrecy: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 33, 45 (2006). 
155. See, e.g., Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, United States v. Taylor, No. 2:08-
CR-00064-TC (D. Utah Jan. 24, 2008); Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, 
United States v. Petersen, No. 2:05-CR-00805-TC (D. Utah Jan. 18, 2008); GAO, QUALIFIED 
INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM, supra note 68, at 23 (describing the 2007 indictment of an adult enter-
tainment mogul for using offshore companies that he owned to overstate business and personal 
expenses while concealing his ownership of those companies); Barton Massey, Convicted Bank 
Chairman Is Key to Dozens of New Tax Haven Cases, 19 TAX NOTES INT’L 959, 959–60 (1999); 
see also Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 17–18 (2008). 
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istrators outside the United States share these same concerns, as demonstrated by 
their discussions in global forums.156 
Understanding the prevalence of concerns regarding the fraudulent use of 
offshore structures to evade tax on domestic business income is imperative to a co-
gent evaluation of anonymous withholding.  Even if all countries adopted an anon-
ymous withholding system, it would not address or deter the use of offshore 
structures and specious transactions to evade tax on domestic business income.  
Withholding in any anonymous withholding system applies only to investment 
income, not contributions to principal.  Thus, the Swiss agreements use a one-time 
charge as a proxy to acknowledge past untaxed principal but have no mechanism 
to help address the evasion of tax on domestic business income through offshore 
accounts on a forward-going basis.  Furthermore, anonymous withholding exists 
to limit information exchange, and thus such a regime runs counter to the exten-
sive cross-border administrative assistance necessary to ferret out tax evasion on 
principal.  Conversely, an appropriately structured system of information exchange 
can call attention to the existence of assets of a domestic taxpayer that may be fund-
ed from income, profits, or gains that evaded taxation.  The U.S. FATCA regime, 
for instance, requires annual asset reporting, including assets held by shell entities, 
as well as income reporting.  This reporting attempts to deter and to identify pat-
terns suggestive of the use of offshore accounts to evade tax on domestic income 
earned by closely held businesses. 
Agreements between the United States and Switzerland over more than a 
decade demonstrate that nontaxation of principal is an important concern for U.S. 
tax administrators.  Normally, the United States insists that tax treaties provide un-
fettered information exchange upon request,157 but until 2010 Switzerland refused 
to provide information exchange upon request to any country with which it entered 
into tax treaties.  The compromise agreed to in 1996 was that the Swiss would pro-
vide information to the United States in situations of tax fraud rather than mere 
  
156. See OECD, SEOUL DECLARATION, THIRD MEETING OF THE OECD FORUM ON TAX 
ADMINISTRATION (2006) (expressing concern of thirty-five tax commissioners and deputy tax 
commissioners from OECD and non-OECD economies regarding outright fraud to conceal income 
and assets using offshore business entities); see also, e.g., ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, COMMISSION 
DES FINANCES, RAPPORT D’INFORMATION NO. 1902, at 147–56 (2009) (Fr.), available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i1902.pdf; Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Steuerhinterziehung (Steuerhinterziehungsbekämpfungsgesetz) [Act to Fight Against Tax Evasion 
(Tax Evasion Act)], July 29, 2009, BGBL I at 2302 (Ger.), available at http://www.bundesfinanz 
ministerium.de/Content/DE/Publikationen/Aktuelle_Gesetze/Gesetze_Verordnungen/040_
SteuerhinterziehunsbekG_anl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 (increasing reporting requirements 
for business transactions with entities in jurisdictions lacking tax transparency). 
157. U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 65, art. 26(1). 
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tax evasion158 (run-of-the-mill tax evasion is not a crime under Swiss law).159  One 
difficulty with this compromise was that it forced the two states to define the term 
“tax fraud” for purposes of the treaty.160  The United States pressed the Swiss on 
this issue repeatedly, which resulted in three sequential agreements, the substance 
of which sheds light on U.S. tax administrators’ offshore tax abuse concerns dur-
ing the Clinton and Bush administrations.  These agreements focused heavily on 
issues likely to arise through the fraudulent use of offshore structures to evade taxes 
on domestic business income.161 
The most recent agreement, in 2003, highlighted U.S. Treasury concerns by 
outlining fourteen examples of offshore tax evasion abuses that would be treated 
as tax fraud.162  Each example involved evasion of tax on domestic-source income 
using offshore accounts.  One representative example involved an individual who 
operates a domestic business, forms a third-country corporation of which he is the 
  
158. Protocol to the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income 
¶ 10, U.S.–Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, 27 U.S.T. 1996 [hereinafter Protocol to 1996 Convention], available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/swiss.pdf. 
159. See Transparency Int’l Switz., Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion, http://www.transparency.ch/financial 
centre/pages/taxfraud.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (“Tax fraud is regulated by the Federal Law on 
Direct Federal Tax (article 186) and the Federal Law on Harmonising the Direct Taxation of 
Cantons and Municipalities (article 59).  Tax evasion is regulated by the Federal Law on Direct 
Federal Tax (articles 175-180) and the Federal Law on Harmonising the Direct Taxation of Cantons 
and Municipalities (article 56).”); X. Ltd. gegen Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung (ESTV) [X. Ltd. 
v. Swiss Fed. Tax Admin.], Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGE] [Federal Administrative Court] May 
5, 2009, A-7342/2008 & A-7426/2008, at 33 (Switz.), available at http://www.odaformation 
permanente.net/details/a_07342_2008_2009_03_05_t-1.pdf. 
160. The history suggests that U.S. officials were not pleased with Swiss officials’ initial (narrow) interpre-
tation of the meaning of the term “tax fraud,” which was defined in paragraph 10 of the protocol 
accompanying the 1996 Convention to mean “fraudulent conduct that causes or is intended to cause 
an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of tax paid to a Contracting State.”  Protocol to 
1996 Convention, supra note 158, ¶ 10.  
161. The initial protocol to the 1996 Convention emphasized that “[f]raudulent conduct is assumed in 
situations where a taxpayer uses, or has the intention to use, a forged or falsified document such as a 
double set of books, a false invoice, an incorrect balance sheet or profit and loss statement, or a ficti-
tious order or, in general, a false piece of documentary evidence.”  Id.  The conduct defined as fraud-
ulent is primarily relevant in relation to evasion of tax on business income rather than investment 
income.  The protocol then dwells on how a state should determine “whether tax fraud exists in a case 
involving the active conduct of a profession or business (including a profession or business conducted 
through a sole proprietorship, partnership or similar enterprise).”  Id.  In 2003 the definition of “tax 
fraud” for purposes of the convention was clarified again, and again focused in substantial measure on 
examples of issues that would most likely arise in connection with evasion of domestic business income 
through the fraudulent use of offshore structures.  Mutual Agreement Regarding the Administration 
of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss–U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 
1996, U.S.–Switz., Jan. 23, 2003 [hereinafter Swiss–U.S. Mutual Agreement]. 
162. Swiss–U.S. Mutual Agreement, supra note 161. 
Battle Over Offshore Accounts 351 
  
disguised owner, and maintains an offshore bank account in the corporate name.163  
The business enters into a contract with the corporation under which the corpora-
tion agrees to perform services for the business.  Such services are never performed, 
but the business pays substantial fees for the service, and the fees are deposited into 
the corporation’s offshore bank account.  The business then records the fees as ex-
penses on the business books and records, and because those books and records are 
used to prepare the individual’s income tax return, his reported domestic taxable 
income is substantially understated. 
Concern about similar abuses led the U.K. Treasury to emphasize the distinc-
tion between information reporting regimes and anonymous withholding regimes 
in deterring tax evasion on domestic business income when it championed infor-
mation exchange over anonymous withholding in the early debates over the EUSD 
at the turn of the twenty-first century.  The U.K. Treasury noted that an infor-
mation exchange system can deter taxpayers from concealing business income 
through offshore structures, while “[e]ven if withholding arrangements were 
adopted by all countries globally, this would not provide an effective solution to 
evasion,” because such systems would not “deter and detect the ‘laundering’ of the 
proceeds of tax evasion through investment abroad.”164 
2. Administrability 
Another argument in favor of anonymous withholding is that even if au-
tomatic information reporting is a substantively preferable system, anonymous 
withholding is less costly and more administrable.  This claim is grossly overstat-
ed.  Anonymous withholding and automatic information reporting share almost 
all the same operational challenges.  A multilateral anonymous withholding sys-
tem along the lines of the Swiss model must (1) determine how to identify taxpay-
ers’ countries of residence, (2) collect information about amounts of interest, 
dividends, capital gains, and other income in order to impose the right withhold-
ing rates, (3) determine which financial institutions are included in the withholding 
system, (4) ensure financial institutions comply with the requirements to identify 
taxpayers with a country of residence and withhold appropriate amounts on iden-
  
163. Id. app. (Hypothetical 6). 
164. See HM TREASURY, U.K., EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON 
TAXATION OF SAVINGS ¶ 3 (2000), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/docs/2000/eoi.html.  
Note that unlike the Labor government in place in 2000, the current U.K. government appears to be 
prepared to accept anonymous withholding.  Perhaps the change of perspective is due to the United 
Kingdom’s growing role as a major offshore asset manager. 
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tified types of income, and (5) determine how to encourage widespread multilat-
eral participation.  The only important aspect of information reporting that is more 
burdensome than anonymous withholding is its requirement for taxpayer identi-
fication numbers (TINs).  On the other hand, an anonymous withholding system 
is more burdensome than information reporting along other dimensions.  In an 
anonymous withholding system, a financial institution must keep track of tax rates 
and rate changes in different categories of income for every country in the world for 
which it applies withholding and then must in fact withhold, instead of simply 
tracking income and gross proceeds and reporting these amounts. 
The only important element of a regime for cross-border administrative as-
sistance that an information reporting system must develop more thoroughly than 
an anonymous withholding regime is a mechanism to transmit information from 
the asset management jurisdiction to the residence country in a form that tax 
administrations can match against residents’ tax returns.165  Assuming that a fi-
nancial institution were to arrange its information technology (IT) systems to col-
lect the necessary information to impose a withholding tax, the rate of which varies 
by the type of income and the customer’s country of residence, providing automat-
ic information reporting instead of withholding requires adding only two pieces to 
the system: TINs and IT systems that allow secure transfer of the requisite infor-
mation in a mutually intelligible format.  Solving the former problem requires every 
residence country interested in benefitting from automatic information exchange 
to issue its taxpayers TINs if it has not done so.  It also requires every financial insti-
tution with offshore accounts to collect those numbers from nonresident account 
holders.166  Solving the latter problem involves significant but feasible investment in 
IT development and time to implement the new technology.  That much has al-
ready been demonstrated by the successful operation of the EUSD167 as well as the 
work of expert groups at the OECD.168 
  
165. Anonymous withholding as proposed in the Swiss agreements still requires financial institutions to be 
prepared to report on individual account holders (at their request), but the scale of that reporting may 
be small enough that it can be done manually. 
166. See OECD, Recommendation on Tax Identification Numbers, supra note 59; see also David E. Spencer, 
OECD Information Exchange Recommendations Are a Significant First Step in Resolving Tax Evasion, 
8 J. INT’L TAX’N 353 (1997); MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 4, art. 
6(4) (providing for a reciprocal commitment to collect taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) or 
dates of birth). 
167. See Report From the Commission to the Council in Accordance With Article 18 of Council Directive 
2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, at 2, COM (2008) 552 
final (Sept. 15, 2008) (emphasizing the need for TINs and with that caveat suggesting exchange is 
workable through preexisting channels of communication established among EU member states). 
168. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 166. 
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The Swiss Banking Association estimates the compliance cost for Swiss 
anonymous withholding for all financial institutions throughout Switzerland will 
be between CHF 300 and 500 million.169  Further, it implies that this one-time 
fixed cost does not increase substantially with the number of jurisdictions for which 
Swiss financial institutions search for nonresident account holders.  CHF 300 to 
500 hundred million diffused across the industry is an expensive but manageable 
cost.  Although the additional cost of collecting TINs and building the IT system 
for fully automatic routine information reporting may be significant, it is unlikely 
to vastly exceed the costs, which are common to automatic information exchange 
and anonymous withholding, of (1) identifying taxpayers and their countries of res-
idence, (2) collecting information about interest, dividends, capital gains, and oth-
er income earned by nonresident taxpayers, and (3) ensuring financial institution 
compliance.170 
Advocates of anonymous withholding often suggest that it is more admin-
istrable and less costly than information reporting by comparing the Swiss model 
to FATCA and noting that anonymous withholding does not require withhold-
ing on financial institutions, or on passthru payments, as does FATCA.  These ar-
guments are not on point.  The withholding imposed by FATCA on financial 
institutions for noncompliance is not a cost of the information reporting system.  
Rather, it is simply the stick chosen by the United States to try to encourage glob-
al compliance.  Any system with global aspirations needs a combination of carrots 
and sticks if it is to drive the vast majority of institutions and governments into the 
system.  FATCA attempts to create a global regime to improve cross-border ad-
ministrative assistance in the face of resistance from certain foreign sovereigns and 
financial institutions.  It therefore requires means of coercion without which vari-
ous financial institutions and sovereigns would not comply.  Swiss anonymous 
withholding, in contrast, is intentionally characterized by contracting.  It requires 
no coercive measures because Switzerland is not attempting to globalize the re-
gime.  Indeed, Switzerland would likely prefer to establish anonymous withholding 
  
169. 2009–2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 148, at 17.  But see Letter From Dr. Jakob Schaad & Urs 
Kapalle, Swiss Banking Ass’n, to Manal Corwin, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Tax Policy (Int’l), U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Michael Danilack & Steve Musher, IRS: FATCA Notice 2011: Submission 
of the Swiss Bankers Association (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/ 
Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_SBA_061011_NOCOPYRIGHT 
NEEDED_062311.pdf (complaining about the excessive cost of FATCA account identification, due 
diligence, and verification procedures as proposed in Notice 2010-60 and Notice 2011-34). 
170. It is of course possible that the Swiss system’s estimated costs are low because it does not do enough to 
identify tax evaders or otherwise ferret out evasion.  The most important point is simply that there will 
not be a monumental cost differential in an apples-to-apples comparison of automatic information 
exchange and anonymous withholding systems. 
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with as few countries as necessary to stop the spread of automatic information re-
porting.  Coercion inevitably imposes greater compliance and political costs than 
contracting, even if the results from coercion are justified.171 
It is inappropriate to think of the cost of mechanisms used to encourage 
widespread multilateral participation among financial institutions and govern-
ments as a cost of an information reporting system rather than an anonymous 
withholding system.  That cost is simply the cost of trying to create a multilateral 
system.  The United States can appropriately be criticized for coercing financial in-
stitutions—by withholding 30 percent on a wide range of payments arising in or 
indirectly attributable to the United States—for the sake of a regime that addresses 
a global problem in a way that (at least initially) benefits only the United States.  If 
such costs were imposed to ensure that automatic information reporting were 
available from most financial institutions in the world to most jurisdictions that 
complied with relevant international standards, however, the calculus regarding 
the cost of coercion would change.  Nothing about that calculus is inherent to the 
choice between information reporting and anonymous withholding. 
B. Governance Concerns 
Tax administration plays a central role in developing national institutions.  
Robust tax administrations are important for national institutions more generally 
because they usually provide the lifeblood of a country’s government.172  Setting 
aside aid-dependent and rentier states, tax administrations fund all other national 
institutions and, as the practical expression of tax policy, represent an important 
component of a country’s economic policy.  Tax administrations also mediate 
more regularly between many private citizens and government than any other single 
government institution.  The tax administration embodies and asserts a govern-
ment’s exclusive authority to tax and demonstrates a government’s effective level 
of control (or lack thereof) in performing its sovereign task of gathering resources 
for the state.173  For these reasons, from a state-building perspective it matters not 
only how much revenue a government raises but also how it raises that revenue. 
  
171. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 33–40 (1999). 
172. See Bird & Zolt, supra note 21, at 1631 (“A country’s tax system is thus both an important and a highly 
visible symbol of its fundamental political and philosophical choices.”). 
173. Cf. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10249, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w10249.pdf (arguing that the capacities to exercise unilateral control over policy instruments 
and to operate without outside influence in internal affairs are the key features of sovereignty). 
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Even if anonymous withholding could be globalized (which I argue it cannot 
be), most countries, especially emerging economies, should prefer automatic 
information reporting for governance-related reasons.  This claim may be contro-
versial because anonymous cross-border withholding could theoretically provide 
revenue to emerging economy government fiscs without those governments need-
ing to build an effective tax administration to collect that revenue.  However, anon-
ymous cross-border withholding on capital income threatens domestic tax morale, 
tends to undermine the expressive role of taxation as a building block of liberal de-
mocracy, and erodes sovereign policy flexibility.  Meanwhile cross-border infor-
mation reporting undergirds voluntary tax compliance and strengthens the capacity 
to govern. 
1. Tax Morale 
Compliance with domestic tax policy is quasi-voluntary; tax collection is sig-
nificantly less costly and more effective if it is motivated by a voluntary willingness 
to cooperate (“tax morale”) even while backed by coercive authority.  Evidence 
from experimental studies and survey data suggest that tax morale is affected by fac-
tors such as citizens’ perceptions of other citizens’ compliance and by perceptions 
of the government’s trustworthiness and competence.174  This research is consistent 
with broader empirical research suggesting that individuals’ willingness to contrib-
ute to public goods depends on whether they trust others to do the same.175  Recent 
work further suggests that tax measures that increase the transparency of tax mat-
ters may help build a culture of tax compliance and thus help maximize revenue 
while minimizing political and enforcement-related conflict.176  In contrast, cross-
border anonymous withholding provides opacity that prevents governments from 
receiving the data that would suggest that they are collecting tax equitably.  It sin-
  
174. See James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe, 
27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 228 (2006) (“[T]ax morale is likely to be influenced by such factors as 
perceptions of fairness, trust in the institutions of government, the nature of the fiscal exchange 
between taxpayers and government, and a range of individual characteristics.”); Leandra Lederman, 
The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1477 (2003) 
(“[T]he development of a sense that others are contributing is likely an important factor in tax 
compliance.”). 
175. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 (2001) (discussing this 
research).  Put another way, reciprocation hinges on contributors’ perceptions that they are not being 
taken advantage of.  See Lederman, supra note 174, at 1477; see also Eric A. Posner, Law and Social 
Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1784–85 (2000). 
176. See Richard M. Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, Societal Institutions and Tax Effort 
in Developing Countries (Ctr. for Research, Econ. Mgmt., & the Arts Working Paper No. 2004-21, 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=662081. 
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gles out an elite class of potential nonpayers who have the sophistication to utilize 
foreign institutions and provides them with special treatment.  A belief in equitable 
treatment and enforcement appears to be crucial to tax morale. 
Tax compliance research also suggests that the government’s level of com-
mitment to enforcing the tax law has an important effect on voluntary compliance 
and tax morale.177  If there is a widespread perception that the government is not 
willing to detect and penalize tax evaders, then tax evasion may be socially legiti-
mized and tax morale will tend to fall.178  In countries like Greece, Italy, or the 
Philippines, weak tax administrations lacking vigorous enforcement programs have 
contributed to tax evasion carrying very little moral opprobrium.179 
Cross-border anonymous withholding arguably represents the tax admin-
istration forswearing any independent effort to collect tax that is due.  It thus may 
legitimize nondeclaration and tax evasion with respect to income earned not only 
through offshore accounts but also more broadly.  Thus, when the U.K. Treasury 
evaluated the anonymous withholding component of the so-called coexistence 
model for the EUSD from the late 1990s—a model that treated withholding and 
reporting as equally satisfactory systems—the U.K. Treasury noted that “exchange 
of information encourages compliance with the tax system.  It provides a deterrent 
to the nondeclaration or under-declaration of income.  In contrast a [cross-border 
anonymous] withholding system, without exchange of information, might appear 
to give the impression of legitimising tax evasion since it fails to deter nondecla-
ration.”180 
2. Other Political Economy Concerns and Consequences 
Even in major developed economies, cross-border anonymous withholding 
raises concerns about the taxpayer’s engagement with the polity and the equality of 
  
177. See Ronald G. Cummings et al., Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence From Surveys and an 
Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447, 456 (2009). 
178. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in Developing and 
Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 
146, 151 (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & James Alm eds., 2003); see also Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 
Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136 (2007) (arguing that noncompli-
ance by other taxpayers tends to decrease a taxpayer’s tax morale and compliance). 
179. See, e.g., Tim Lister, Tax Evasion Is a National Pastime Afflicting Southern Europe, CNN, Nov. 2, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-02/opinion/opinion_europe-shadow-economies_1_tax-evasion-
tax-collection-tax-rates?_s=PM:OPINION. 
180. HM TREASURY, supra note 164, ¶ 3.4. 
Battle Over Offshore Accounts 357 
  
citizens in the face of the taxing authority.181  These concerns have even greater sa-
lience in many emerging and developing economies where tax evasion is frequent-
ly characterized as systemic and the taxation of elites is often a source of special 
concern.182  In contrast to anonymous withholding, information reporting, like 
identified withholding, allows the income taxation of elites to be sufficiently visi-
ble such that it may help support the legitimacy of the governance structure in the 
eyes of all citizens. 
When taxpayers feel they are subject to generally applicable taxes imposed by 
the sovereign, scholarship suggests that they are more likely to insist collectively on 
meaningful representation.183  A generation of economists, economic historians, 
sociologists, and political scientists has been influenced by the idea that relatively 
broad-based and transparent taxation, especially of mobile assets, generally tends 
to produce more representative government.184  On the other hand, some of these 
scholars suggest that external funding allowed third-world client regimes during 
  
181. Michael Backhaus & Angelika Hellemann, Sigmar Gabriel: “Und wir sollten die Bürger darüber 
abstimmen lassen,” Teil 2 [Sigmar Gabriel: “And We Should Let the Citizens Vote on It,” Part 2], BILD 
(Sept. 25, 2011, 12:16 AM), http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/sigmar-gabriel/wir-muessen-die-eu-
reformieren-die-buerger-abstimmen-lassen-teil-2-20134564.bild.html (Ger.); see also supra notes 
164–165 and accompanying text. 
182. See Alm & Martinez-Vazquez, supra note 178, at 151; Clive S. Gray, Enhancing Transparency in Tax 
Administration in Madagascar and Tanzania (Afr. Econ. Policy Discussion Paper No. 77, 2001), 
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACM656.pdf. 
183. For instance, some historians explain the contrast between English liberty and French absolutism for 
three hundred years in part with reference to the prevalence of tax exemptions for French nobles, as 
compared to a transparent, direct tax burden borne relatively uniformly by the English nobility.  The 
argument is that in England, elites were motivated to ensure a robust national assembly with mean-
ingful authority and rule of law that constrained the executive, whereas in France, those incentives 
were lacking.  See Aristide R. Zolberg, Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France 
and England, 32 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 687, 712 (1980). 
184. See generally NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN 
WORLD, 1700–2000, at 81–106 (2001); MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988); 
Robert H. Bates & Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative 
Government, 14 POL. & SOC’Y 53 (1985); Robert H. Bates, The Economics of Transitions to 
Democracy, 24 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 24 (1991).  See also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 49 (1990); CHARLES TILLY, 
COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990–1990, at 96–114 (1990); Martin C. 
McGuire & Mancur Olson, Jr., The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and 
the Use of Force, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 72 (1996); Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, 
and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1993); Michael L. Ross, Does Taxation Lead to 
Representation?, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 229 (2004) (showing regressions consistent with the hypothesis 
that higher taxes relative to total government services make states more democratic but inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that higher taxes relative to income lead to democratization); James E. Mahon, 
Jr., Liberal States and Fiscal Contracts: Aspects of the Political Economy of Public Finance (Ann. Meeting 
of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Conference Paper, 2005), available at http://citation.allacademic.com// 
meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/1/1/pages40115/p40115-1.php. 
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the Cold War to avoid entering into implicit or explicit social fiscal contracts with 
their citizenry in which they exchanged law and representation for resources.185  
Others argue that oil wealth hinders liberal democracy because it allows oil-rich 
governments to avoid taxation of domestic residents and the societal bargains that 
come with such taxation.186  In both examples, external funding allowed autocrats 
to avoid liberal democracy. 
Similarly, in an anonymous withholding regime, tax collected abroad may be 
more akin to a source of external funding than to funding provided by citizens in a 
transparent relationship with their government.  When domestic authorities han-
dle tax compliance, governments are under pressure to respond to citizen demands 
in order to enhance tax compliance and sustain state revenues.187  Cross-border 
anonymous withholding obviates the need to strengthen governance institutions to 
collect revenue, as it presupposes collection and remittance by a foreign financial 
institution under a foreign sovereign’s regulatory authority.  Furthermore, relying 
on foreign financial institutions for routine tax collection rather than on domestic 
withholding, information reporting, quasi-voluntary self-assessment, or some 
combination of all three, may reduce the capacity of compliant and visible taxpayers 
to bargain for law and representation in exchange for tax revenues.188  In contrast, 
automatic information exchange may strengthen domestic governance institutions 
both by improving the capacity of domestic authorities to handle tax compliance 
and by forcing an interaction between government and taxpayers in order for tax 
to be collected.189 
A cross-border anonymous withholding system also may undermine the role 
that taxation of capital income can play in providing a sense of fairness within a lib-
eral democracy.  Information reporting provides some assurance to the entire soci-
  
185. See, e.g., TILLY, supra note 184, at 207–22. 
186. See Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in THE ARAB STATE 85 (Giacomo Luciani 
ed., 1990); Giacomo Luciani, The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization, in 
DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOCRATS? THE RENEWAL OF POLITICS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 
130 (Ghassan Salamé ed., 1994); Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 
325 (2001); see also Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Drowning Freedom in Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/opinion/drowning-freedom-in-oil.html. 
187. See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 184, Mick Moore, How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance? 
(Inst. of Dev. Studies Working Paper No. 280, 2007), available at http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/ 
pdfs/Wp280.pdf. 
188. Government will tend to heed the concerns of taxpayers and attempt to achieve quasi-voluntary com-
pliance in an information reporting system precisely because automatic information exchange will 
never be perfect. 
189. Even when tax is enforced domestically via withholding by domestic financial institutions, domestic 
tax authorities must regulate the process by which withholding is imposed, which forces them to 
develop the capacity to oversee such withholding. 
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ety that tax on capital income is in fact being collected from wealthy taxpayers.  A 
government can, for example, provide reports showing distributional breakdowns 
of the tax burden.  In contrast, cross-border anonymous withholding can un-
dermine the perceived legitimacy of the government by eroding the citizenry’s con-
fidence that the government is raising funds in an equitable manner.190  In this 
regard, it is important to recognize that the value anonymous withholding pur-
ports to uphold, financial privacy vis-à-vis one’s own government in matters of tax-
ation, rejects the basic information reporting/information availability model for 
tax enforcement in almost every major developed economy.191  Perhaps for these 
reasons, in discussing cross-border anonymous withholding, Sigmar Gabriel, 
chairman of Germany’s Social Democratic Party, has suggested that the Swiss–
German anonymous withholding agreement is “destroying people’s sense of jus-
tice,” and sending a message that “whoever is rich can buy themselves free from 
punishment.”192  If the transparency of taxation has any role to play in constituting 
the democratic experience, then moving to an anonymous withholding system to 
collect those taxes most likely to be associated with privilege undermines that role. 
Some scholars suggest that visible, progressive taxation of capital income and 
closely held business income at the top of the income distribution is a necessary 
symbol of the commitment to fairness in a liberal democracy.193  Others suggest 
  
190. For instance, if anonymous withholding were commonplace it would not be possible to show accu-
rately what part of the income tax the top 1 percent of income earners paid.  See Margaret Levi & 
Audrey Sacks, Achieving Good Government—and, Maybe, Legitimacy (Paper Produced for the World 
Bank Conference, “New Frontiers of Social Policy,” Dec. 12–15, 2005), available at http://site 
resources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/ACHIEVING 
GOODGOVERNMENT.pdf (arguing that the legitimacy of what we might consider a good 
government requires the citizenry to believe that the government is raising funds in an equitable 
manner in addition to serving the public good). 
191. Against this background, concerns regarding the potential for misuse of exchanged information by tax 
administrators in some countries cannot serve as a justification for favoring anonymous withholding 
over information reporting for cross-border activities generally.  See supra note 121.  Such concerns do, 
however, suggest the importance of safeguards to prevent and penalize misuse of taxpayer infor-
mation.  See infra notes 240–241. 
192. See Backhaus & Hellemann, supra note 181. 
193. See, e.g., Bird & Zolt, supra note 21, at 1683 (noting that “symbols matter” and that in the develop-
ing world “[a] progressive income tax, whatever its defects in practice, may be an important and 
sometimes critical symbol of concern with the distributive outcomes of the market system”); Maureen 
B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415 (2003); see also MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX 
PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 54 (2008) (noting that even schoolchildren conclude that fairness 
in a democracy involves some degree of progressive taxation based on ability to pay).  Some scholars 
claim that without visibly progressive taxation, public support for growth-inducing policies like free 
trade may fray and economic populism may become a more pronounced feature of government.  See, 
e.g., ROGER C. ALTMAN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., PATH TO PROSPERITY: AN ECONOMIC 
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that imposing taxes on mobile assets in a transparent manner encourages collective 
bargaining with the sovereign and thus results in the emergence of more repre-
sentative and classically liberal government.194  An automatic information report-
ing system that identifies prosperous individual taxpayers and requires them to 
participate in the act of paying taxes (and perhaps encourages them to lobby to re-
duce those taxes) achieves both of these ends.  In contrast, anonymous cross-border 
withholding of income tax on capital income may change the taxing relationship 
between the citizen and the state.  At minimum, it reduces the taxpayer’s awareness 
of a domestic fiscal process and any consequent likelihood to engage the polity to 
demand accountability.  Beyond that, cross-border anonymous withholding may 
shake all citizens’ confidence that the government is raising funds equitably.195  In 
the context of major developed economies, the pressures on liberal democracy from 
anonymous withholding may be significantly less relevant.  But in the context of 
emerging and developing economies still working to achieve robust democratic 
governance, these same pressures should not be underestimated.196 
3. Maintaining Policy Flexibility 
In contrast to automatic information reporting, anonymous withholding sub-
stantially reduces sovereign authority and policy flexibility, especially for less pow-
erful states, by permanently outsourcing tax collection on capital income to foreign 
sovereigns and by removing unilateral control over tax policy instruments.  Anon-
ymous withholding thus threatens the organization and effectiveness of domestic 
administrative and political authority, as well as sovereign autonomy, understood 
as the capacity to exclude external actors from domestic policy decisions. 
  
STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE MORE BROADLY SHARED GROWTH 7 (2008), available at http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/11/path to prosperity/11_path_to_ 
prosperity; Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, A New Deal for Globalization, 86 FOREIGN 
AFF. 34 (2007). 
194. See generally LEVI, supra note 184; Bates & Lien, supra note 184.  Niall Ferguson suggests that direct 
taxes on elites are positively associated with the growth of representative institutions.  FERGUSON, 
supra note 184, at 81; see also Wilson Prichard, Taxation and State Building: Towards a Governance 
Focused Tax Reform Agenda 24 (Inst. of Dev. Studies Working Paper No. 341, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/Wp341%20web.pdf (“The greatest challenge in improving en-
forcement equity, and thus strengthening the basis for collective tax bargaining, lies in improving 
taxation of elites.  The poor enforcement of personal income taxes is in some respects the defining 
feature of developing country tax systems, with implications for revenue and legitimacy.”). 
195. See generally Levi & Sacks, supra note 190.  In contrast, cross-border information reporting can pro-
vide a tool to preserve the state’s role as the ultimate tax assessments enforcer. 
196. See generally Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, supra note 176. 
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The Swiss agreements show hints of each of these problems.  Under the 
terms of those agreements, if a partner country adjusts its tax rates on income or 
gains after the agreements are signed, withholding tax imposed by Switzerland 
is amended by the same number of percentage points that the statutory rates are 
amended unless the competent authority of Switzerland decides that it will not 
adjust the applicable tax rates.197  Furthermore, the treaties lock in a particular def-
inition of income, dividends, other income, and capital gain that cannot be changed 
without bilateral agreement.198  The agreements thus cede to Switzerland a meas-
ure of final authority over whether the income and gains of the partner country 
residents will be taxed according to the partner country’s law.  From a practical 
standpoint, it is difficult to imagine Switzerland refusing to adjust withholding 
rates consistent with German or British policy decisions in the medium term; 
Switzerland would likely refrain from such action out of fear of retaliation and a 
desire to see the Swiss approach accepted internationally.  But when generalized 
to other countries, the fact that the Swiss retain even a nominal right to overrule 
partner country tax policy decisions with respect to partner country nationals has 
remarkable implications for tax sovereignty.  It highlights the Swiss view that 
the partner country’s receipt of income from their nationals investing through 
Switzerland is a discretionary Swiss policy decision rather than any matter of right.  
In principle, the Swiss agreements require jurisdictions (1) to cede a measure of 
their ability to assert taxing authority domestically over their residents, (2) to con-
  
197. U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 20(2); Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, 
supra note 15, art. 19(2); Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 18(2).  Austria, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom may change their tax rates applicable to income and gain, and 
in such instances they must inform Switzerland without delay.  At that point, Switzerland has 
thirty days to inform the countries as to whether it refuses to adjust the rates at which it withholds 
anonymously by the same percentage as the rates have changed under Austrian, German, or U.K. 
law.  U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 20(2); Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 19(2); Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 
18(2).  Under the agreements, Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom are allowed to terminate 
the agreement with six months’ notice if Switzerland does not adjust its withholding rate to corre-
spond with a domestic U.K. rate change.  U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 
44(3)–(4); Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 43(3)–(4); Austria–Switz. 
Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 40(3)–(4).  This is more flexible than the general termi-
nation rules under the agreements, which are intended to lock both jurisdictions into the agreement by 
requiring at least two years’ notice to terminate.  U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, 
art. 44(2); Ger.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 43(2); Austria–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 5, art. 40(2). 
198. U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 25–28; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 24–27; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 
23–26.  Note that the general two-year termination period would apply if a government chose to 
abandon the agreement out of concern regarding the definition of a category of income. 
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sider Swiss reactions when making domestic taxing decisions, and (3) to forego the 
option of seeking additional information from their residents. 
These problems crystallize when one imagines anonymous withholding along 
the lines of the Swiss–U.K./German agreements in the context of an agreement 
between an asset management jurisdiction and a less powerful middle-income 
economy.  A country without significant market leverage over Switzerland or oth-
er offshore asset management jurisdictions would, by entering into anonymous 
withholding agreements, significantly compromise its unilateral control over the 
appropriately domestic decisions about tax rates on domestic residents’ capital 
income.  Policymakers in such a jurisdiction would need to ask whether, if they al-
tered their domestic taxing regime, Switzerland and every other jurisdiction provid-
ing them with anonymous withholding services would agree to go along.  If such a 
jurisdiction were to rely on anonymous withholding, some of the resources that 
sustain the state would be in another sovereign’s hands.  Sovereign autonomy could 
be compromised for most countries, and over time, large asset management juris-
dictions could gain significant power over many countries’ tax policy choices and 
perhaps gain influence over other foreign policy choices as well. 
More generally, an anonymous withholding regime is not compatible with a 
progressive income tax and benefits system.  Anonymous withholding undermines 
the enforceability of a tax or benefits system that provides assistance (such as an 
earned income tax credit or unemployment support) that phases out with income 
or savings.199  Further, permitting anonymous withholding is incompatible with 
maintaining a fully functional comprehensive income tax with graduated rates.200  
The Swiss agreements assume a jurisdiction has chosen a schedular income tax sys-
tem (taxing different categories of income at fixed, flat rates) rather than a compre-
hensive income tax that applies a graduated rate schedule to all income or defined 
categories of income.  In this way, anonymous withholding agreements compro-
mise any state’s authority over the domestic tax regime. 
  
199. It would not be possible to effectively administer an earned income tax credit that is not available to 
those with substantial amounts of capital income in a system that permits taxpayers to avoid reporting 
capital income by earning it through offshore accounts.  Similarly, enforcing unemployment support 
programs along the lines of Germany’s Arbeitslosengeld II program requires the government to be able 
to determine the amount of savings held by potential claimants.   
200. If a country abandons tax or other social benefits intended to be limited to residents with low levels of 
taxable income, then anonymous withholding systems may be imperfectly reconciled with a compre-
hensive income tax system that accepts overtaxation by imposing the highest marginal tax rate 
for any given category of income on all income in that category of income on which anonymous 
withholding is imposed. 
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A critic might acknowledge the above concerns regarding domestic policy 
flexibility and sovereign autonomy but dismiss them as alarmist, since there is heavy 
bias for home-country asset management.  As described in Part I, however, the fact 
that today only 6.5 percent of global wealth is managed offshore201 masks the reali-
ty that in some regions outside the most developed economies, offshore asset man-
agement is effectively the norm.  For example, in Argentina, at least 47 percent of 
national wealth (and 74 percent of the wealth controlled by households with greater 
than $100,000 in managed assets) is managed offshore.202  Further, the offshore 
asset management industry continues to grow.  The potential for expanded growth 
in the context of anonymous withholding is highlighted by the fact that the Swiss–
German anonymous withholding agreement was explicitly conditioned on Ger-
man concessions to facilitate Swiss financial institutions’ access to German cus-
tomers.203  The concessions Switzerland extracted from Germany make it easier 
for wealthy Germans to bank exclusively through Swiss institutions without the 
Swiss institution maintaining any German footprint.204  Similar provisions are in-
corporated in the Swiss–Austrian agreement.205  If, in exchange for anonymous 
withholding, offshore asset management jurisdictions were able consistently to 
extract concessions allowing them to compete legally with domestic financial insti-
tutions without having local footprints or being subject to local regulation, a further 
  
201. See supra note 1. 
202. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 1, at 12.  Argentina is not unique.  For instance, in Mexico 
from 2005 to 2010, 75 percent of the 47 percent of national wealth held by millionaire households 
was managed offshore.  Id. 
203. The Swiss negotiated for simplified exemptions from regulation under the German Banking Act for 
Swiss financial institutions that want to supply banking and financial products in Germany, and were 
able to eliminate the requirement either to create a subsidiary or branch in Germany or to operate in 
partnership with an existing German financial institution, in order to legally serve German clients.  See 
Switzerland and Germany Initial Tax Agreement, supra note 128. 
204. The German Banking Act generally provides that financial service providers from non–European 
Economic Area (EEA) countries (Switzerland is not in the EEA) that want to supply banking and 
financial products in Germany must obtain a permit to create a subsidiary or branch in Germany.  
Kreditwesengesetz [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, as amended, 
§§ 32(1), 33(1), 53(1) (Ger.).  Such financial institutions are subject to the German banking rules 
regardless of whether they are established or resident in Germany, or are located or resident abroad 
but have focused on the German market to carry out business with persons who are resident or ordi-
narily resident in Germany.  Id. § 32.  Furthermore, client relationships with German residents must 
be established through a domestic financial institution.  Under the agreement reached between 
Switzerland and Germany, the permit exemption procedure that was technically available to Swiss 
institutions will be simplified, and Swiss institutions’ obligation to initiate legal client relationships 
via a local German financial institution will be eliminated. 
205. Memorandum zu verfahrensrechtlichen Aspekten grenzüberschreitender Tätigkeiten im Finanzbereich 
[Memorandum on Procedural Aspects of Cross-Border Activities in the Financial Sector], in 
Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, at 30.  
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shift toward offshore asset management among wealthy individuals could easily 
occur. 
In contrast to anonymous withholding, an automatic information exchange 
regime would strengthen sovereign authority and thereby improve policy flexibil-
ity and governance capacity, particularly for less powerful sovereigns.  Rather than 
constraining the set of tax policy choices a government may make, as anonymous 
withholding would, automatic information exchange broadens the potential for 
tax policies that can be consistently enforced among all residents.  It allows for a 
more legitimate domestic political authority while reclaiming for the state authori-
ty over one important consequence of financial globalization.   
C. Political Dynamics 
Practically speaking, most nation-states are unlikely to provide anonymous 
withholding, and those that do are unlikely to provide anonymous withholding to 
a wide range of other nation-states.  Furthermore, the proponents of an anony-
mous withholding system have no interest in its globalization.  As explained below, 
for these reasons most policymakers internationally should prefer automatic infor-
mation reporting to anonymous withholding because the latter cannot be global-
ized.  Further, there will come a point when bilateral anonymous withholding 
arrangements will impede progress toward information reporting arrangements for 
all but the most economically powerful countries.  In contrast, automatic infor-
mation exchange solutions that initially meet the demands of developed economies 
can be globalized over time to provide benefits to other tax administrations as well. 
The likely equilibrium for the anonymous withholding regime put forth by 
Switzerland would be for Switzerland to reach agreements with the large devel-
oped economies that can exert pressure for cross-border tax administrative sup-
port, neutralize the United States by moving forward with the Joint Statement II 
framework, and then cease to negotiate further anonymous withholding agree-
ments with other governments.  In time, pressure from the major developed econ-
omies besides the United States would likely lead other large offshore asset 
management jurisdictions to follow Switzerland’s lead and reach anonymous 
withholding agreements with these states as the price of resolving conflicts with 
the major developed economies.  By the same token, a reciprocal, broadly multi-
lateral anonymous withholding regime in which most jurisdictions around the 
world agree to withhold anonymously for most other jurisdictions is highly implau-
sible.  Among other reasons, large developed economies are unlikely to agree to 
collect tax automatically for other, less powerful sovereigns. 
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1. Limited One-Way Anonymous Withholding Agreements 
Switzerland’s leadership recognizes that anonymous withholding in a small 
number of targeted agreements can diffuse pressure for Swiss information report-
ing to a broader group of countries.206  Thus, in their agreements with Austria, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, the Swiss insisted that those countries each 
commit to uphold the anonymous withholding model and not to work against it in 
dealings with third parties.207  If anonymous withholding agreements are reached 
with each of the large financial centers other than the United States, with which 
the Swiss financial industry does business (and in which Swiss banks have sub-
stantial business operations), the remainder of the world’s jurisdictions would be 
relatively powerless to put pressure on Switzerland or its banks to erode bank se-
crecy further or even to make anonymous withholding more widely available to 
other jurisdictions.  Managing assets for nonresidents from most of the world 
would likely continue on a tax-shielded basis. 
Eventually the large financial centers may be able to pressure other offshore 
asset management centers into anonymous withholding agreements if they so 
choose.  The Swiss agreements appear structured to produce precisely such ne-
gotiations.  Each agreement includes provisions that both allow partner country 
taxpayers to evade the force of the agreement by moving their assets before the ef-
fective date and also give the partner country information on the jurisdictions to 
which those taxpayers most commonly choose to move those untaxed assets.208 
It is important to recognize that for any large developed economy, anony-
mous withholding by Switzerland alone is unlikely to deter tax evasion substantially 
because high-quality wealth-management services are available in many jurisdic-
  
206. See Leo Müller & Erik Nolmans, Steuerabkommen: Daumen drücken, BILANZ (Dec. 10, 2011), http:// 
www.bilanz.ch/unternehmen/steuerabkommen-daumen-druecken. 
207. Both agreements provide that the parties will “neither violate the provisions [of the agreement] 
through an unilateral act nor work against the agreed provisions in their dealings with third parties.”  
Joint Declaration Concerning the Equivalence of This Agreement, in U.K.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/joint-dec-equivalence.pdf; 
Gemeinsame Erklärung der Vertragsstaaten zur Gleichwertigkeit dieses Abkommens [Joint 
Declaration Concerning the Equivalence of This Agreement], in Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, at 44; Gemeinsame Erklärung der Vertragsstaaten zur Gleichwertigkeit 
dieses Abkommens [Joint Declaration Concerning the Equivalence of This Agreement], in Austria–
Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, at 27. 
208. British and German residents who transfer their assets before the last day of the fifth month following 
the effective date of the agreement can avoid the withholding tax imposed as the default compliance 
provision under the treaties.  See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 18; Ger.–
Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra 
note 5, art. 15. 
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tions.  Arrangements based on the Swiss model only ensure that dedicated tax 
evaders from countries with such agreements do not keep Swiss bank accounts if 
they wish to avoid taxation.  Evaders can easily close Swiss accounts and open ac-
counts in other jurisdictions (such as Singapore), including non-Swiss branches of 
Swiss banks. 
The Swiss agreements state that Swiss banks will not “knowingly encourage” 
their current clients to use such strategies—a provision of questionable enforceabil-
ity and relevance, given that the agreements both permit and anticipate the trans-
fers.209  Swiss banks are allowed to facilitate these asset transfers on request from 
current customers and to promote evasion through non-Swiss branches of Swiss 
banks going forward.  Thus, the statistical disclosure in the Swiss agreements ena-
bles Switzerland to enlist Germany, the United Kingdom, and other governments 
with which it enters agreements to level the playing field for Switzerland, relative to 
other offshore asset management jurisdictions.210 
If Germany and the United Kingdom were to ratify their agreements with 
Switzerland, they would likely be motivated to pursue further bilateral anonymous 
withholding agreements.  After ratifying their agreements with Switzerland, they 
(or any other developed economies that accept the Swiss model) may find it diffi-
cult to promote or negotiate for automatic information exchange multilaterally.  
Having accepted the premise with Switzerland that anonymous withholding is an 
acceptable substitute for automatic information reporting, and having agreed not to 
work against the anonymous withholding model, the current German and U.K. 
governments may find it difficult to refuse anonymous withholding from other 
offshore asset management jurisdictions as a substitute for automatic information 
exchange.  Indeed, but for the political pressure currently being exerted against rat-
ification of the Swiss agreements, the current German and U.K. governments 
would seem poised to affirmatively pursue anonymous arrangements with other 
offshore asset management jurisdictions.  This would include any negotiations with 
jurisdictions that Swiss data suggest are the major destinations for German and 
U.K. evader funds.211  Anonymous withholding agreements between those juris-
dictions and Germany and the United Kingdom would make it easier for all asset 
  
209. See, e.g., U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 33. 
210. Meanwhile Joint Statement II and FATCA withholding ensure a better-than-level playing field for 
Swiss financial institutions vis-à-vis investments in the United States, relative to countries that have 
not entered into a framework for cooperation with the United States to facilitate implementation of 
FATCA.  See Joint Statement II, supra note 6. 
211. See, e.g., supra note 176 and accompanying text.  The Labour Party in the United Kingdom and the 
Social Democratic Party in Germany both oppose the Swiss agreements, such that those agreements 
may not be ratified or, if ratified, might be terminated by a subsequent German or U.K. government. 
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management jurisdictions to agree to anonymous withholding for a limited set of 
powerful states and to reject broadly multilateral automatic information exchange.  
To support the development of a broadly multilateral automatic information ex-
change system effectively, Germany and the United Kingdom probably need to af-
firmatively decide not to ratify (or terminate) their agreements with Switzerland. 
2. Broadly Multilateral Reciprocal Anonymous Withholding 
The second conceivable steady-state solution arising from the Swiss approach 
is a broadly multilateral anonymous withholding regime in which jurisdictions 
around the world agree to withhold anonymously for one another.  Such a solu-
tion is highly implausible.  Offshore asset management jurisdictions have no inter-
est in a global reciprocal anonymous withholding system.  More importantly, the 
large developed economies would not contemplate such a system because they are 
uninterested in collecting tax on behalf of every other country around the world.  
The revenue Germany and the United Kingdom would receive through anony-
mous withholding from Switzerland greatly exceeds the amounts they would need 
to transfer to Switzerland if they were withholding on its behalf.  Nevertheless, in 
the Swiss agreements, the partner countries agree only that Switzerland may re-
quest that measures be introduced by the partner countries that provide exchange 
of information from them to Switzerland, and only to the extent similar approaches 
are adopted by the partner country in relation to other states.212  Switzerland repre-
sents an unusual case in which the revenue flow would be overwhelmingly in the 
partner country’s favor.  It is hard to imagine that these jurisdictions would be pre-
pared or willing to provide anonymous withholding in the vast majority of cases, 
where the outflows from the partner country fisc could vastly exceed the inflows. 
British and German behavior in this regard is both predictable and consistent 
with widely prevailing concepts of sovereignty in the tax context.  In contrast to 
information reporting, anonymous withholding implies more than mere coopera-
tion among governments.  Rather, it requires governments to collect taxes for one 
another.  Cross-border anonymous withholding is a form of automatic collection 
assistance provided to other sovereigns.  In the common law countries (which rep-
resent approximately half of the world’s GDP),213 the presumption against col-
  
212. See U.K.–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 15, art. 36; Ger.–Switz. Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 34; Austria–Switz. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 5, art. 31. 
213. M. Marshall, World Economy Hinges on China’s Bankruptcy Law, Wood Says, VA. LAW (Mar. 16, 
2005), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2005_spr/china_wood.htm. 
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lecting revenue for other governments runs deep, both as a policy matter and as a 
legal one. 
Policymakers commonly understand limitations on the extent to which a na-
tion will provide collection assistance to another nation as a straightforward appli-
cation of the principle of territorially limited state sovereignty.214  A key component 
of exclusive territorial authority is the unique right to impose tax on that territory.  
As a first-order matter, maintaining sovereignty requires the sovereign authority 
within a state to exclude another state from pursuing its tax claims in the home 
state’s territory.215  The default assumptions that stipulate appropriate behavior by a 
political entity therefore create a substantial presumption against collection assis-
tance.  States may agree to provide a taxing benefit on their territory to other states, 
but they must be provided significant incentives to do so. 
Without strong contrary incentives, powerful states are highly unlikely to al-
low the erosion of their sovereign authority by facilitating the extraterritorial exer-
cise of taxing power within their territory.  This explains why, although the OECD 
Model Tax Convention has included a model provision for collection assistance in 
specific cases (assuming the residence country can provide all necessary infor-
mation) since 2003, the official commentary describes the provision in realist 
terms.216  The agreed commentary observes that during negotiations each contract-
ing state will need to decide whether collection assistance upon request (that is, 
limited to specific cases) should be included in a treaty with another state based 
on its own instrumental motives and legal traditions.217  The OECD Model 
Commentary acknowledges that even when tax debts are fully determined by the 
  
214. Cf. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 379–80 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]s to 
foreign customs and tax laws, there is scant room for doubt about Congress’ general perspective: 
Congress has actively indicated, through both domestic legislation and treaties, that it intends ‘strictly 
[to] limit the parameters of any assistance given’ to foreign nations.” (latter alteration in original) 
(quoting Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 119 (2d 
Cir. 2001))). 
215. See, e.g., U.N. Secretariat, Ad Hoc Grp. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Mutual 
Assistance in Collection of Tax Debts, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2001/L.2 (Aug. 30, 2001); ASIF H. 
QURESHI, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAXATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 
308 (1994); Alan R. Johnson et al., Reciprocal Enforcement of Tax Claims Through Tax Treaties, 33 TAX 
LAW. 469, 469–70 (1980). 
216. The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing 
Countries (U.N. Model Convention) has no collection assistance provision, although the U.N. Tax 
Committee is reported to have agreed to include an assistance collection provision in the next version 
of the U.N. Model Convention.  Michael Lennard, The UN Model Tax Convention as Compared With 
the OECD Model Tax Convention—Current Points of Difference and Recent Developments, ASIA-PAC. 
TAX BULL., Jan./Feb. 2009, at 4, 10. 
217. Id. 
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residence state, and even in the limited context of case-specific assistance, collec-
tion assistance will only be provided between sovereigns where there is an align-
ment of interests and a shared judgment as to mutual economic benefit.218 
As a judicial matter, the presumption against collecting revenues for other 
governments even in specific cases is enshrined in what is known as the revenue 
rule.  The revenue rule overrides what are otherwise commonly applicable norms of 
cross-border judicial comity and holds that a court will not give domestic effect to 
the taxes, fines, or penalties imposed by a foreign sovereign.219  Although it began 
as a common law doctrine,220 the revenue rule is sufficiently deeply entrenched as a 
default in both common law221 and civil law jurisdictions that it is sometimes de-
  
218. The idea of cross-border collection assistance in some form has a longstanding place in international 
tax dialogue but has never made much headway.  The first proposal for cross-border assistance in 
recovering tax claims in specific cases arose in the League of Nations.  LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 
FISCAL COMM., LONDON AND MEXICO MODEL TAX CONVENTIONS: COMMENTARY AND 
TEXT 100 (1946) (“Model Bilateral Convention for the Establishment of Reciprocal Administrative 
Assistance for the Assessment and Collection of Direct Taxes: Mexico Draft”); id. at 100 (“Model 
Bilateral Convention for the Establishment of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance for the 
Assessment and Collection of Taxes on Income, Property, Estates and Successions: London Draft”).  
Subsequently the OECD developed the Model Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in the Recovery of Tax Claims in 1981.  OECD, MODEL CONVENTION FOR MUTUAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN THE RECOVERY OF TAX CLAIMS: REPORT OF THE OECD 
COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS (1981).  In both cases, collection assistance was limited to 
specific cases rather than any form of automatic withholding arrangement, let alone anonymous 
withholding.  Neither convention ever came into force. 
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987) (“Courts in the United 
States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or 
penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”); see also id., reporter’s note 1 (citing Holman v. 
Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.)).  The sovereignty concerns underlying the revenue rule 
also explain why tax debts and claims are generally excluded from conventions and instruments 
regulating international cooperation in recognizing and enforcing legal judgments that are of general 
(rather than tax-specific) application.  See, e.g., Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 1, Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 
4; Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 2 (EC) (excluding 
revenue, customs, and administrative matters from its scope of application via article 1.1 of that 
regulation).  But see European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters art. 1, Apr. 20, 
1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185 (allowing assistance in processing fiscal offences). 
220. The rule as known at common law dates at least to Attorney General v. Lutwydge, a 1729 English court 
case that held that the court could not enforce a bond executed in Scotland to enforce Scottish import 
duties on tobacco because the obligation was a foreign tax obligation.  Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, (1729) 
145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div.); see, e.g., Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94 (N.Y. 1806) (holding 
that the defendant could not avoid enforcement of a promissory note on the basis that the plaintiff had 
violated a French revenue provision requiring French stamp tax first be paid); see also Brenda Mallinak, 
The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 79, 79–83 (2006).   
221. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413–14, 448, 450 n.11 (1964); United 
States v. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366 (Can.); see also Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491 (H.L.) 
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scribed as “the first and most fundamental rule of international tax law.”222  While 
some argue that there have been incursions on the judicial doctrine, the basic judi-
cial presumption reflects the policymaking default against collecting tax for foreign 
sovereigns.223 
3. Multilateral Automatic Information Exchange 
Unlike cross-border collection assistance, the idea of cross-border tax infor-
mation exchange has global acceptance, at least upon request.  Since 2009, eve-
ry financial center of any significance, including all of the more than one hundred 
member countries of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information, has endorsed the international standards calling for tax information 
exchange.224  The G8, the G20, the OECD, and the United Nations also have en-
dorsed them.225   
  
508 (appeal taken from Eng.); Williams & Humbert Ltd. v. W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., 
[1986] A.C. 368 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, [1955] A.C. 
516 (Ir. H. Ct. 1950) (surveying application of the revenue rule by U.K. courts), aff’d, [1955] A.C. 530 
(Ir. S.C. 1951); William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 363, 373 n.43 (2001) (treating the application of the revenue rule in both common 
law and civil law countries as a subcategory of a disinclination to enforce foreign public law). 
222. Vitaly S. Timokhov, Enforcing Tax Judgments Across Borders: How Collection Assistance Can Overcome 
Limitations of the “Revenue Rule” (Part 1), J. INT’L TAX’N, June 2003, at 34, 37; see also Vitaly S. 
Timokhov, Enforcing Tax Judgments Across Borders: How Collection Assistance Can Overcome Limitations 
of the “Revenue Rule” (Part 2), 14 J. INT’L TAX’N, Sept. 2003, at 20. 
223. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 361 (2005) (“[A]t its core, [the revenue rule] 
prohibited the collection of tax obligations of foreign nations.”); Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 
at 448 (White, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and penal laws of a 
foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign 
sovereign.”), quoted in Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369–70. 
224. GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY & EXCH. OF INFO. FOR TAX PURPOSES, OECD, 
TAX TRANSPARENCY 2011: REPORT ON PROGRESS 2 (2011) [hereinafter GLOBAL FORUM, TAX 
TRANSPARENCY], available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/48981620.pdf. 
225. See, e.g., Rep. of the Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, 2d Sess., Oct. 30–Nov. 
3, 2006, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2006/6/Add.1; ESCOR, Supp. 45 (2006); G7, ECONOMIC 
COMMUNIQUÉ: MAKING A SUCCESS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL ¶ 16 
(1996), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/1996/eco.html; G8, THE 
GLENEAGLES COMMUNIQUÉ: AFRICA ¶ 14(i) (2005), available at http://www.unglobalcompact. 
org/docs/about_the_gc/government_support/PostG8_Gleneagles_Communique.pdf; G20, 
COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS, 
OCTOBER 15–16, 2005 ¶ 2 (2005), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/ 
convention/g20/g20_051016.pdf; OECD, PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: A BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF 2 (2010); GLOBAL 
FORUM, TAX TRANSPARENCY, supra note 224, at 2; see also, e.g., OECD, COUNTERING 
INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION, supra note 25; OECD, TAX CO-OPERATION 2010: TOWARDS 
A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD—ASSESSMENT BY THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND 
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These standards are formally cabined to information exchange upon request.  
Thus, the breach of bank secrecy that these standards require technically only ap-
plies where there is a request for foreseeably relevant information about a specific 
individual.  There is nothing in the standards that is conceptually limited to ex-
change upon request, however, and there is no normative reason for exchange to 
be limited to information about one individual at a time.  Indeed, a newcomer with 
fresh eyes looking at these internationally-agreed-upon standards would have a dif-
ficult time understanding why they did not mandate that all ascribing jurisdictions 
routinely provide information exchange in those cases where the information is 
foreseeably relevant (for example, in the case of capital income accruing to a known 
resident of another state with an income tax). 
The recently revised Multilateral Convention provides a multilateral 
framework under which automatic cross-border tax information exchange could be 
established among a broad range of sovereign participants.226  The 2010 protocol 
made changes that (when integrated with the preexisting convention) make the 
Multilateral Convention a landmark agreement.  The protocol incorporates 
the internationally accepted standards for the exchange of foreseeably relevant 
information regardless of bank secrecy and moves in the direction of multilateral 
routine information exchange by requiring signatories to accept requests from all 
other signatories with respect to “ascertainable groups or classes of persons.”227  
This aspect of the protocol indicates a shift in international norms toward multilat-
eral automatic information exchange.228  The Multilateral Convention opens the 
  
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES 9, 15 (2010).  A “high-level working panel” 
convened by the United Nations has previously proposed an International Tax Organization to 
provide a mechanism for multilateral tax information sharing to curb the scope of tax evasion on 
investment income earned abroad.  U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated June 25, 2001 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/1000 (June 
26, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf. 
226. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
227. Explanatory Report to the Convention as Amended by the Protocol, Protocol Amending the 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, May 27, 2010, E.T.S. No. 127, ¶ 
167, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/127-Revised.htm. 
228. Article III of the 2010 Protocol amends Article 18 of the Multilateral Convention to clarify that a 
request can be made without the name and address of a specific taxpayer.  OECD & COUNCIL OF 
EUR., MULTILATERAL CONVENTION, supra note 93.  The Explanatory Report to the Convention 
goes on explicitly to bless requests made with respect to ascertainable groups or classes of persons.  
See OECD, REVISED EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 22 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
ctp/exchangeofinformation/48091084.pdf; see also OECD, 2012 UPDATE, supra note 26.  The 
changes to the Commentary to Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention agreed in the summer of 
2012 move the Commentary to Article 26 in the direction of the Multilateral Convention’s stance 
with respect to ascertainable group requests. 
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door to multilateral automatic information exchange through provisions intend-
ed to facilitate such exchange, although it requires competent authorities to reach 
further agreements to bring automatic information exchange into force.229 
The amended Multilateral Convention can function as a full-fledged vehicle 
for automatic information exchange among signatories while requiring countries to 
protect taxpayer information from misuse and respect taxpayer rights.  On June 1, 
2011, the convention was opened to signature by any country in the world.  As 
of May 2012, thirty-five countries had signed the Protocol to the Multilateral 
Convention,230 and every G20 member had endorsed it.231 
The trend in universally accepted standards for information exchange, the 
development of a series of emerging automatic information exchange approaches, 
and the progress made by the Multilateral Convention suggest that acceptance of 
a widely utilized system that requires financial institutions to function as cross-
border tax intermediaries through automatic information reporting may be within 
reach. 
IV. THE PATH TOWARD A MULTILATERAL AUTOMATIC 
INFORMATION REPORTING SYSTEM 
Any new regime for routine cross-border administrative assistance is likely to 
become an institutionally embedded structure that is susceptible to long periods of 
stasis.  The risk of stasis following the present evolutionary moment in cross-border 
tax administrative assistance raises the stakes in the present contest between anon-
ymous withholding and automatic information reporting.  Since a partial anony-
mous withholding system can emerge via contracting, while automatic information 
exchange on offshore accounts by asset management jurisdictions likely requires 
coercion, partial anonymous withholding is the easier and more likely default.  To 
  
229. See OECD & COUNCIL OF EUR., MULTILATERAL CONVENTION, supra note 93, art. 6. 
230. Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States have signed.  See Status of the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and Amending Protocol, CETS No. 127, COUNCIL 
EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=127&CM=1&DF=&CL= 
ENG (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
231. For a list of G20 members, see supra note 10.  At the November 2011 G20 Summit, all G20 coun-
tries also noted, “we will consider exchanging information automatically on a voluntary basis as 
appropriate and as provided for in the convention.”  Cannes Summit Final Declaration—“Building Our 
Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All,” G20, ¶ 35 (Nov. 4, 2011), http:// 
www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/for-the-press/news-releases/cannes-summit-final-declara 
tion.1557.html. 
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avoid partial anonymous withholding and establish the superior automatic infor-
mation reporting system, governments will have to make steady progress toward a 
relatively uniform multilateral approach to information exchange and impose coer-
cive incentives for participation. 
As suggested in Part II, the starting point for a multilateral system likely in-
volves reconciling the current EU, OECD, and U.S. approaches.  Building such a 
system requires substantial agreement among participating countries about certain 
design features.  The key dimensions of the EU, OECD, and U.S. systems that 
would need to be reconciled are routing, identification, reporting, scope, verifica-
tion, and incentives.  A comprehensive blueprint for reconciling the emerging ap-
proaches to automatic information reporting along each of these dimensions is 
beyond the scope of this Article.232  Joint Statement I implies the need for such rec-
onciliation, however, and the purpose here is to offer some observations as to what 
could be done to reconcile the emerging approaches and promote a multilateral 
system.  I also suggest some safeguards to ensure that an emerging multilateral au-
tomatic information exchange system protects against the misuse of exchanged 
information.   
First, the rules for establishing a multilateral automatic information reporting 
regime should be bifurcated.  Cooperating jurisdictions should impose one set of 
obligations on financial institutions located in other cooperating jurisdictions and a 
different, more stringent set of obligations on financial institutions located outside 
cooperating jurisdictions.  Not only are different design decisions appropriate for 
these two fact patterns, but also, as the discussion below illustrates, creating two 
separate regimes would likely spur financial institutions to pressure governments to 
participate since participation could reduce the burden for domestic financial in-
stitutions.  While bifurcated rules are necessary, alone they are insufficient to 
encourage the creation of a multilateral automatic information exchange system.  
Governments also must agree on a set of coercive incentives that push noncoop-
erating jurisdictions to join the system and financial institutions to comply even 
before their governments do.  The following discussion provides some preliminary 
views on how to apply these two principles in building a multilateral automatic 
  
232. One obvious point is that reciprocal identification and reporting obligations would need to be im-
posed on financial institutions in all cooperating jurisdictions.  This would mean, for example, that 
U.S. financial institutions would need to exercise the same due diligence to identify accounts of 
non-U.S. persons and collect precisely the same information on accounts of non-U.S. persons that the 
United States wishes to receive with respect to U.S. persons with offshore accounts.  Although it has 
finalized the bank deposit interest regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,391, 23,394–95 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be 
codified at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-1 to -8), the U.S. Treasury has not yet provided regulatory guidance 
to this effect as a companion to its efforts under FATCA. 
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information exchange system by considering certain design questions associated 
with routing, identification, reporting, verification, and incentives in a multilateral 
system. 
A. Routing 
Routing issues are important because they represent the most basic structural 
inconsistency between today’s emerging automatic information exchange ap-
proaches.  Routing also deserves attention because routing raises questions about 
sovereign access to and authority over information.  Under the OECD’s TRACE 
approach, financial institutions report information regarding specific items of 
income received by a taxpayer to the government of the country that is the source 
of that income.  That government may then decide to exchange the information 
with the taxpayer’s country of residence if it so desires and if appropriate infor-
mation exchange arrangements are in place.  Under the EU approach, in contrast, 
financial institutions report on specific items of income received by an EU resi-
dent to the government where the financial institution managing the assets resides.  
EU governments then exchange information related to each other’s resident 
taxpayers through arrangements of reciprocity.  Finally, under FATCA, foreign 
financial institutions report comprehensively on assets and certain measures of 
income of U.S. persons held and/or earned through accounts at those institu-
tions.233  As legislated, they report directly to the government of the jurisdiction 
where the taxpayer resides (the United States). 
The EUSD’s routing system is superior for jurisdictions that are cooperating 
with one another.  It ensures that financial institutions in cooperative jurisdictions 
need only send information to one government, under whose law they already op-
erate, thereby avoiding the specter of thousands of financial institutions attempting 
to comply with different reporting obligations to dozens of governments.  Report-
ing by financial institutions to the government of the jurisdiction in which they 
reside, followed by government-to-government exchange, also conforms most 
closely to current global understandings regarding first-instance sovereign access 
to banking information.  The government of the asset management country pre-
sumptively can already access the relevant information under current law and regu-
lations.234  The EUSD system thus avoids the conflict-of-law issues associated with 
  
233. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-1 C.B. 765, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-
34.pdf. 
234. Indeed, government access to such information for tax information exchange purposes is required 
pursuant to the internationally-agreed-upon standards for tax information exchange upon request.  See 
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financial institutions reporting directly to foreign sovereigns.  It also avoids con-
cerns about power shifts associated with adopting a multilateral information 
exchange regime that alters the distribution of information with respect to nonres-
ident accounts.235  Likely for these reasons, Joint Statement I contemplates adopt-
ing the EU routing system for cooperating countries.236 
FATCA’s statutory routing system for reporting directly from financial insti-
tutions to foreign sovereigns violates local financial privacy and data protection law 
in many jurisdictions.237  It is therefore inappropriate for countries that are cooper-
ating with one another.  However, requiring information reporting directly from 
would-be-compliant financial institutions located in noncooperating jurisdictions 
pressures those jurisdictions to cooperate.  It also provides a mechanism for finan-
cial institutions that wish to cooperate with new global norms to do so regardless 
of their government’s policy decisions.  Thus, FATCA’s statutory routing system 
provides a useful tool for eliciting compliance from cooperative financial institu-
tions in jurisdictions that resist cooperating with a multilateral information report-
ing regime and for pressuring those governments to cooperate. 
The ICG system’s routing model, on the other hand, is inapt for a multilat-
eral regime focused on residence taxation.  It sends information around the horn 
from account holders’ financial institutions to source countries, and from source 
countries on to residence countries.  In the process it disaggregates the information 
relevant to residence countries—a complete picture of their residents’ offshore ac-
  
OECD, TERMS OF REFERENCE: TO MONITOR AND REVIEW PROGRESS TOWARDS 
TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES 6–7 (2010) 
[hereinafter OECD, TERMS OF REFERENCE], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/42/ 
44824681.pdf. 
235. To illustrate the point, imagine that to comply with FATCA, the IRS issued administrative guidance 
requiring financial institutions to provide the IRS information on the accounts of all nonresident 
account holders (not just U.S. accounts).  Imagine the IRS then promised to forward information it 
received about each country’s residents to tax administrations around the world.  In principle this 
arrangement could create a multilateral system.  For certain sovereigns, such a system might even be 
attractive, especially if it would give them valuable information they did not believe they could obtain 
by other means.  If such a system applied to nonresident accounts of all countries, however, the United 
States would have access to and control of all information about all nonresident accounts around the 
world.  Many sovereigns would oppose such a system.  In contrast, a globalized version of the EU 
routing system would send information about nonresidents through the country where asset manage-
ment occurs.  The asset management country’s government presumptively already could access that 
information today.  For that reason alone, this system seems both the fairest and least disruptive.  
Further, the EU routing system forwards only information about a country’s residents to that country’s 
government.  In this way, it does not raise the same issues about informational power raised by the 
earlier hypothetical. 
236. Joint Statement I, supra note 4. 
237. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also Joint Statement I, supra note 4. 
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counts—and excludes part of that picture, namely information related to payments 
not eligible for reduced withholding.  
B. Identifying Taxpayers and Their Countries of Residence 
The taxpayer identification rules for participating financial institutions in the 
ICG system require those institutions to check a customer’s self-declared identity 
and residence against all other information the institution already has in its posses-
sion.238  The ICG system’s principle (using information already in a financial insti-
tution’s possession) is a more accurate starting point for a multilateral system than 
the EUSD’s current rule (which treats taxpayers as residing wherever they resided 
at the time their most recent passport was issued).239  FATCA’s customer identi-
fication rules are just one way of fleshing out the details of the OECD’s principle, 
and those identification rules may prove a useful starting point for discussions of 
how to implement a multilateral regime.240  However, FATCA’s rules for cus-
tomer identification (as described in proposed Treasury regulations released on 
February 8, 2012) are highly prescriptive.241 
In many cases involving financial institutions in cooperating jurisdictions, 
highly prescriptive rules may be costly to implement without providing any benefit 
  
238. OECD, REPORT BY THE PILOT GROUP ON IMPROVING PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR 
CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS: POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF 
FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS: IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE 9–10 (2010), available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/36/44556378.pdf. 
239. Discussion of proposals to, inter alia, strengthen the identification rules of the EUSD and ensure that 
it covers all payments that are equivalent to interest has been ongoing since 2008, but the European 
Union has not yet reached unanimity on these matters.  See Proposal for a Council Directive Amending 
Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, at 15–16, COM 
(2008) 727 final (Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/ 
documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_directive_review/com(2008)727_en.pdf. 
240. A broadly multilateral system would be unlikely to identify nonresident citizens.  The United States is 
almost alone globally in taxing bona fide nonresident citizens as if they were residents.  Indeed, bona 
fide nonresident U.S. citizens working outside the United States have in some instances encountered 
serious difficulties banking in the countries in which they reside as a result of FATCA.  Such persons 
rightfully note that their bank accounts in the country where they reside are not offshore accounts 
and that it is inappropriate for regulatory rules to make it difficult for them to maintain residence 
country financial accounts.  For one account, see Letter From Marylouise Serrato, Exec. Dir. & Jackie 
Bugnion, Dir., Am. Citizens Abroad, to Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Manal Corwin, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, IRS 
& Steve Musher, Assoc. Chief Counsel (Int’l), IRS (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.deloitte. 
com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_ACA_2011_18533_1_
090811.pdf. 
241. Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding 
on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities; Proposed Rule, 
77 Fed. Reg. 9021 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1471–1.1474). 
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to governments beyond those available through a principles-based system.  Rules 
that allow financial institutions to exercise greater judgment could substantially re-
duce costs.  Governments should not be concerned about less prescriptive rules for 
financial institutions in cooperating jurisdictions if cooperating jurisdictions (1) de-
velop shared principles for due diligence to determine beneficial ownership of ac-
counts, (2) impose legal sanctions on domestic financial institutions that fail to 
adequately discharge a legal duty to identify nonresident beneficial owners of ac-
counts, and (3) commit to use credible domestic regulatory mechanisms to enforce 
these (potentially risk-based) rules (together “Principles-Based Rules”).  A more 
prescriptive system, however, with tougher customer identification rules, is appro-
priate where domestic regulatory oversight is absent and therefore does not provide 
an additional incentive for good-faith compliance.  The U.S. experience with UBS 
and other private banks might suggest some caution regarding reliance on know-
your-customer information and subjective reason-to-know standards alone for fi-
nancial institutions not located in participating countries.  For the United States, 
bifurcation of customer identification rules would suggest tightening prescriptive 
due-diligence rules imposed under FATCA regulations while agreeing to more 
principles-based and less onerous rules as part of the Joint Statement I process with 
cooperating governments.  Indeed the model intergovernmental agreement effec-
tively permits financial institutions in Joint Statement I countries to use less on-
erous, more principles-based techniques developed for anti-money-laundering 
purposes to identify account holders and the country of residence of their control-
ling persons.242  However, the model intergovernmental agreement is not mul-
tilateral.  It merely provides the basis for a series of bilateral agreements with the 
United States.  It therefore does not take the next step of prescribing standards co-
operating jurisdictions must meet to qualify for Principles-Based Rules. 
C. Reporting 
In proposed regulations, the U.S. Treasury replaced FATCA’s statutory rule 
for what information should be reported by financial institutions with a rule requir-
ing reporting of dividends, interest, and other income, as well as gross proceeds, 
determined under the same principles that a financial institution uses to report 
information in its jurisdiction of residence.243  The U.S. Treasury’s decision with 
regard to income reporting conforms the basis for determining amount and char-
  
242. MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 4. 
243. 77 Fed. Reg. at 9032 (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(4)). 
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acter of income for FATCA reporting purposes to the European Union’s Directive 
on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation.244  If the FATCA reg-
ulations are viewed as a predecessor to a multilateral system, however, FATCA re-
porting guidelines also may represent the United States’s initial view of what types 
of information should be reported in a multilateral system with respect to offshore 
accounts.  As described in Part III, account balance reporting is likely important to 
addressing evasion with respect to untaxed principal.245 
D. Verifying Financial Institution Compliance 
If financial institutions must report the same information for both resident 
and nonresident account holders to the tax administration of the country in which 
they are located, then it may be reasonable to rely on participating countries’ self-
interest in their own tax base to ensure appropriate implementation of the taxpay-
er identification and information reporting rules.  Further verification arguably 
becomes unnecessary.246  The European Union sensibly relies on this principle un-
der the presumption that institutions whose compliance with the EUSD would 
need to be verified are already subject to domestic regulatory regimes that make 
similar demands.  The concept would be similarly compelling in the context of a 
multilateral system if countries have agreed to Principles-Based Rules. 
For compliant institutions in noncooperative jurisdictions, however, some 
independent verification system is needed to ensure compliance.  Of course, nonco-
operative jurisdictions will not let the tax administration of a complying sovereign 
into their country to verify financial institution compliance.  Thus, relying on inde-
  
244. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
245. Note, however, that the Joint Statement and model intergovernmental agreements imply that 
FATCA Partner Countries will implement legislation to collect and report the information 
required under FATCA.  Joint Statement I, supra note 4.  Yet, account balance reporting may not 
be required with respect to domestic accounts under most countries’ existing law, even among 
countries that rely on information reporting systems to collect tax on capital income.  Thus, changes 
in domestic law or regulations to allow for account balance reporting for nonresident accounts will 
present a significant challenge for a multilateral system that would be significantly eased by agreed-
upon international standards in this regard. 
246. A multilateral regime could also incorporate an explicit requirement that the enforcement mech-
anisms that apply to ensure domestic reporting also must apply with respect to nonresident accounts.  
Note that the model intergovernmental agreement issued by the United States and the G-5 includes 
an analogous provision suggesting that if one competent authority believes a financial institution in the 
other jurisdiction is engaged in significant noncompliance, it may notify its counterpart competent 
authority, and that competent authority will apply its domestic law (including penalties im-
posed domestically) to address the described noncompliance.  MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AGREEMENT, supra note 4, art. 5(2)(a). 
Battle Over Offshore Accounts 379 
  
pendent accounting firms to verify compliance in noncooperative jurisdictions 
would seem the most promising approach in the context of a cross-border au-
tomatic information reporting system that has achieved broad multilateral ac-
ceptance, such that audits are limited to a small number of jurisdictions.247 
E. Encouraging Compliance 
As described in Part III.A, ensuring compliance with a new global regime 
is likely to require some level of coercion, or what the G20 calls “defensive 
measures.”248  FATCA’s 30 percent withholding tax is best understood as such a 
defensive measure.  Similarly, FATCA’s passthru payment rules are, at the highest 
level, best understood as an attempt to expand the reach of this defensive meas-
ure.  Here, FATCA differs from the OECD approach, which lacks coercive 
measures to ensure broad compliance.  It also differs from the EU approach, which 
can mandate government participation within the European Union but currently 
lacks mechanisms to broaden the system beyond the member states and their de-
pendencies.  A multilateral regime that realistically intends to ensure global com-
pliance should require all participating jurisdictions to impose some defensive 
measure.  These cooperating jurisdictions need not impose 30 percent withholding, 
but similar coercive measures are a necessary component of a multilateral automat-
ic information reporting system.  Otherwise, noncooperative jurisdictions and insti-
tutions benefit from defecting from the emerging regime because they can become 
repositories of choice for tax evader assets without paying a significant price for 
making that business decision.  In recognition of this reality, both Joint Statement 
I and the model intergovernmental agreement that followed Joint Statement I 
commit the parties to “develop a practical and effective alternative approach to 
achieve the policy objectives of passthru payment withholding.”249 
Coercive measures are necessary to create a multilateral automatic infor-
mation exchange system, but they are also incompatible with the existence of bilat-
eral anonymous withholding arrangements.  Indeed, if one or more major financial 
centers were prepared to impose defensive measures, but were willing to suspend 
those measures if they received anonymous withholding from another jurisdiction 
  
247. Cost considerations mitigate strongly against independent accounting firm verification until broad 
multilateral acceptance is achieved.  This presents just one example of how verification rules under 
FATCA and verification rules for a multilateral system should be different. 
248. See supra note 10. 
249. Joint Statement I, supra note 4; MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 4, 
art. 6(2). 
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on a bilateral basis, it would undercut the coercive force of coordinated defensive 
measures.  The lost leverage affects not only the countries receiving anonymous 
withholding but also all other countries participating in the multilateral automat-
ic information exchange system.  The negative consequences thus redound largely 
to less wealthy, less powerful economies.  A jurisdiction can defect from the au-
tomatic information exchange system, provide anonymous withholding to a few 
powerful financial centers, and continue promoting anonymity without withhold-
ing for residents of all other jurisdictions.  For this reason, the Swiss anonymous 
withholding agreements are difficult to reconcile with a multilateral automatic 
information exchange system. 
A related concern regarding lost leverage for a multilateral automatic infor-
mation exchange system arises under the bilateral framework proposed by the 
United States and Switzerland in Joint Statement II.  However, the impact of 
the Joint Statement II framework on third countries that desire automatic infor-
mation exchange is mixed.  Unlike the Swiss anonymous withholding agreements, 
Joint Statement II forces Swiss financial institutions to build the information re-
porting architecture required for FATCA compliance and forces Swiss law to ac-
commodate such reporting as the price of avoiding FATCA withholding.  At the 
same time, Joint Statement II does suspend defensive measures in return for con-
cessions to the United States alone. 
As with FATCA, coercive measures adopted to promote a multilateral system 
should function on the principle that a financial institution in a noncooperating ju-
risdiction will not be punished if it reports information directly and circumvents the 
tax administration of the country in which the institution is located.  Such measures 
put pressure on financial institutions to comply regardless of local law and on gov-
ernments to change local law to allow financial institutions to comply. 
F. Addressing Concerns Regarding Potential Misuse of Information 
One of the critical principles under existing international standards for infor-
mation exchange upon request is that the residence state receiving information 
must ensure that exchanged information is only used for legitimate tax administra-
tion purposes.250  Countries that do not abide by this standard are not entitled to 
  
250. The current globally agreed rules developed over a long period in response to, inter alia, the concern 
that information exchange could be used to facilitate improper efforts to attach or confiscate assets by 
abusive or illegitimate regimes.  Such concerns are important in an information exchange upon re-
quest system.  Indeed, these concerns may be more pronounced in information exchange upon request 
than in automatic information exchange because unlike automatic information exchange, informa-
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information exchange upon request under current international standards.  The 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
(Global Forum), a peer review body that includes over one hundred member ju-
risdictions, is mandated to assess jurisdictions to ensure that they all adhere to this 
high standard, and those assessments are presently ongoing.251  In an automatic 
information exchange system, the same high standards proscribing misuse of infor-
mation would presumably apply.  In fact, the current members of the Multilateral 
Convention have clarified that they will not admit to the convention new countries 
that do not have proper safeguards in place to ensure that exchanged information 
will not be misused.252  A multilateral automatic information exchange system 
should both enforce the existing Multilateral Convention’s upfront requirement 
that governments have laws in place consistent with international standards to pre-
vent the misuse of exchanged information, and provide for monitoring systems and 
credible sanctions (including denial of information exchange or removal from the 
multilateral system) as part of the establishment of any multilateral automatic 
information exchange system.253  Taking these two steps would both protect the 
  
tion exchange upon request asks the requested jurisdiction to use its investigatory powers on behalf of 
the requesting state.  The protections for taxpayer rights and exchanged information built into the 
current international standards are focused on ensuring that exchanged information is only used for 
legitimate tax administration purposes.  See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 25, art. 
26(2); OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS, art. 8 
(2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf; OECD, TERMS OF 
REFERENCE, supra note 234, at 8–9 (describing the globally agreed standard against which all 102 
members of the Global Forum are presently being assessed, including terms of reference C.3. and C.4. 
regarding protecting against misuse of information and ensuring safeguards for taxpayers); see also 
supra note 121. 
251. See GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY & EXCH. OF INFO. FOR TAX PURPOSES, OECD, 
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE G20 (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeof 
information/G20_Progress_Report_June_2012.pdf. 
252. See OECD, CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS: 
PROCESS TO BECOME A PARTY TO THE AMENDED CONVENTION (n.d.), available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/Process_to_Become_a_Party_to_the_Amended_
Convention.pdf. 
253. The appropriate monitoring system could involve an expansion of the current Global Forum assess-
ment process, with a special in-depth ongoing monitoring system on the question of whether auto-
matically exchanged information is used by a government that receives information in ways consistent 
with the existing international standards that protect taxpayers’ rights, and proscribe use of exchanged 
information for purposes other than legitimate tax administration purposes.  Indeed, the beginnings 
of such a process will commence late in 2012.  At that point, the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information Phase II peer reviews will begin to consider whether, in practice, juris-
dictions conform to the rules limiting the use of information exchanged upon request to legitimate tax 
administration purposes.  See GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY & EXCH. OF INFO. FOR TAX 
PURPOSES, OECD, REVISED METHODOLOGY FOR PEER REVIEWS AND NON-MEMBER 
REVIEWS (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/44824721.pdf. 
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integrity of an automatic information exchange system and very substantially 
encourage compliance with global standards for protecting taxpayer information 
from misuse. 
CONCLUSION 
In just a few short years, the world has gone from assuming that financial 
institutions generally do not support residence country cross-border taxation to 
arguing about how they should act as tax agents for residence countries.  This 
represents a remarkable shift in international norms.  Focusing exclusively on the 
contest between the information reporting and anonymous withholding models 
for a new regime inappropriately obscures the growing consensus.  The competing 
initiatives for cross-border tax administrative assistance put forth by the United 
States, the European Union, the OECD, and Switzerland, and the response of fi-
nancial institutions to those proposals, all highlight the development of a new 
international regime in which financial institutions will be cross-border tax inter-
mediaries. 
Nevertheless, a great deal is at stake in the choices currently being made be-
tween partial anonymous withholding and a broadly available automatic infor-
mation reporting regime for cross-border administrative assistance.  The choice 
between the two approaches is real even if the consequences of choosing between 
the available alternatives seem somewhat distant for most jurisdictions.  Path-
dependence and the tendency for institutional structures in this area to become 
embedded suggest that suboptimal decisions made by a small number of powerful 
actors may dictate outcomes for both those actors and the rest of the world for a 
prolonged period. 
Anonymous withholding is not likely to be made available to most countries.  
In contrast, information reporting provides a workable architecture for an emerging 
regime of financial institutions acting as cross-border tax intermediaries in which 
most countries may reasonably aspire to participate.  Even though some jurisdic-
tions can be counted on to resist a broadly available automatic information report-
ing system, if these countries become outliers, international regimes will evolve 
around them, and eventually pressure may make noncompliance with the regime 
unsustainable. 
Emerging-economy governments and other stakeholders, including civil so-
ciety, have many reasons beyond sheer revenue to weigh in on the choices being 
made by the major actors in this evolutionary moment.  Information reporting can 
help sustain tax morale in a financially integrated world.  Information reporting 
may also allow capital income taxation to play a role in building a liberal democracy 
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that is accepted as legitimate by its people and to encourage taxpayers to engage with 
the polity and demand government accountability.  Anonymous withholding, in 
contrast, institutionalizes differentiated treatment for the most sophisticated taxpay-
ers from the rest of society.  Further, anonymous withholding systems leave open 
the possibility that asset management jurisdictions may one day decline to im-
plement a country’s changes in its own tax regime, thereby undermining domestic 
authority as well as policy flexibility, especially for less powerful states. 
Together, the emerging models presented by the European Union, the 
OECD, and the United States hold within them the seeds of a workable auto-
matic information reporting regime.  Multilateral vehicles also already exist to 
work toward a multilateral system.  For instance, the Coordinating Body of the 
Multilateral Convention has the authority to study methods and procedures to 
increase international cooperation in tax matters, and the Multilateral Convention 
provides the legal authority for multilateral automatic information exchange.  In-
ternational tax policymakers should seize the present evolutionary moment and 
push for the emerging automatic information exchange approaches to be recon-
ciled in a manner that can support the tax administration needs of developed and 
emerging economies alike. 
 
